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1. The proper normative treatment of human capital under the income tax system has
similarly plagued scholars.  See, e.g., David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital:
Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1992);
Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs  or Why Costs of Higher
Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993); Louis Kaplow,
Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994); Lawrence Zelenak,
The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX
L. REV. 1 (1995).
2. See, e.g., RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 77 (1982); Anne
L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 487 (2007)
[hereinafter Alstott, Equal Opportunity]; Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively:
Replacing the Estate Tax with an Inheritance Tax 20 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
07-25, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993314.
3. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990)
(generally arguing for confiscatory federal wealth transfer taxation but completely exempting
these transfers from the gift tax base).  
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. According to a 2008 report by the College Board, Over the past decade, [p]ublished
tuition and fees have risen at an average rate of 2.4% per year after inflation at private four-year
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A parent pays a childs college tuition bill or an elderly relatives medical
bills.  Should these transfers be treated as gifts subject to gift taxation?  It turns
out that this is an extraordinarily difficult question to answer because of the
competing considerations in play.1  The question is so difficult, in fact, that
many tax scholars quarantine these transfers in general discussions about the
ideal federal wealth transfer tax base.2  Others who wander into this quagmire
often arrive at surprising answers to this question.3  Economists debating the
issue cannot agree on whether education or healthcare payments made on
behalf of another should be considered gratuitous transfers.4  Competing
models of donor motivation, including the altruism and bequest-as-exchange
models, suggest diametrically opposed accounts of the proper gift tax
treatment of these transfers.5
It also turns out that how these transfers should be treated under the gift tax
system is an enormously important question given the magnitude of wealth
transferred for these purposes.6  Average annual increases in college tuition
and medical expenses have outpaced inflation since the early 1980s.7
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colleges over the past decade, compared to 2.9% in the preceding decade and 4.1% from 1978-
79 to 1988-89.  COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2, 9 figs.4 & 5 (2008), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/trends-in-college-pricing-2008.pdf.  The
College Board further reports that in the same period, published tuition and fees have risen at
an average rate of 4.2% per year after inflation at public four-year institutions, compared to
4.1% in the preceding decade and 2.4% from 1978-79 to 1988-89.  Id.  Similarly, health care
spending . . . has risen about 2.7 percent faster than the overall economy for the past half
century.  ENGELBERG CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE REFORM AT BROOKINGS, REAL HEALTHCARE
REFORM IN 2009:GETTING TO BETTER QUALITY,HIGHER VALUE, AND SUSTAINABLE COVERAGE
2 & fig.1 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/~/media/Files/events/
2008/1117_realhealthcare/1117_strategicreview.pdf.  
8. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.  
12. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983);
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 109-12 (1991); Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at
Odds with Equality?  The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
Furthermore, with the scheduled repeal of the estate and generation-skipping
transfer taxes under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001,8 the gift tax is poised to become the new front where battles are
fought over the legitimacy and scope of federal wealth transfer taxation.
This article initially frames the issue in two ways: (1) through the lens of a
proposal by the American Law Institute to exempt all transfers for
consumption from gift taxation,9 and (2) within the context of a debate among
economists about whether such expenditures should be included in the
definition of intergenerational transfers for purposes of determining the total
share of such transfers in U.S. accumulated wealth.10  Finding the first lens
unsatisfactory on its own doctrinal terms and the second lens inconclusive, the
article shifts the focus of analysis to the normative first principles of equality
of opportunity and family autonomy, arguing that such principles should be
the ultimate arbiter of this federal wealth transfer tax base question.11  The
main claim of this article is that the current exclusion of education and
healthcare transfers from the gift tax base is indefensible under an equal
opportunity framework, but that outright repeal of the exclusion is neither
desirable (because of the competing value of family autonomy) nor politically
possible (because of strong taxpayer opposition to the full gift taxation of these
transfers).  
In arriving at this claim, the article positions the gift tax base inquiry with
regard to education and healthcare transfers within a larger debate among
liberal egalitarian political theorists over the seeming incommensurability
between the norm of equality of opportunity and the institution of the family.12
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(2008) [hereinafter Alstott, Family at Odds]; Anne L. Alstott, Family Values, Inheritance Law,
and Inheritance Taxation (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-49, 2008) [hereinafter
Alstott, Family Values] (forthcoming in 63 TAX L. REV. (2010)), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1300440.
13. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
14. See discussion infra Part V.B.
15. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(b), 95 Stat. 172,
319 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2006)).  
16. See discussion infra Part VI.
Congresss all-or-nothing approach to the gift taxation of these transfers
suggests that it has implicitly adopted the incommensurability view.  Prior to
1981, all education and healthcare transfers were subject to gift taxation.13
This impinged on the individuals liberty interest in family autonomy and
consequently led to wide-scale noncompliance and nonenforcement, thus
undermining the legitimacy of the gift tax as a whole.14  Since 1981, all tuition
and medical expense payments have been categorically excluded from gift
taxation.15  This approach fails to adequately respect the demands of the
equality of opportunity norm.
Given that the foundational principles of equality of opportunity and family
autonomy conflict, this article argues that an all-or-nothing legislative
approach is inappropriate.  Rather, Congress should attempt to balance these
competing interests by adopting a middle-ground approach to the taxation
of education and healthcare transfers.  This article proposes an alternative to
the current unlimited gift tax exclusion for tuition and medical care payments.
Specifically, Congress should convert the existing gift tax exclusion into a tax
credit available after exhaustion of the donors general gift tax exemption
amounts.16  This approach generally includes education and healthcare
transfers in the gift tax base (furthering equality of opportunity) but prevents
such inclusion from ever causing a gift tax to be due and payable (recognizing
family autonomy concerns).  The effect of using a donors general gift tax
exemptions to shelter education and healthcare (human capital) transfers would
be a reduction in the amount of tax-free noneducation, nonhealthcare
(material) gifts the donor could make.  This approach recognizes that human
capital transfers pose as much, if not more, of a threat to fair equality of
opportunity as do material transfers.  Furthermore, forcing a donor to use his
or her general gift tax exemptions to shelter education and healthcare transfers
seems appropriate in light of the family-autonomy-furthering role these
exemptions play in the federal wealth transfer tax scheme.  
Part I of this article provides background on the federal gift tax and the
existing gift tax exclusion for education and medical expense transfers.  Part
II critically analyzes the current exclusions historical antecedent: an American
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17. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 756, 777.  The original estate tax was
imposed for the purpose of raising revenue.  See id. at pmbl.
18. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16.  This version of
the gift tax was repealed in 1926.  Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125.  The
federal gift tax also serves as a backstop to the income tax by preventing those in higher income
brackets from transferring income-producing property to those in lower income tax brackets in
order to achieve a lower combined income tax liability.  RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL.,FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION ¶ 9.01 (8th ed. 2002).
19. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501-531, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (2006)).
20. Each tax had its own specific exemption and its own rates.  See A. James Casner,
Reporters Study of Dual Tax System and Unified Tax, in FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS STUDIES
58, 60-61 (1969) [hereinafter A.L.I. RECOMMENDATIONS]; Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and
Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 244 (1956).  Even prior to 1976, some transfers
triggered both a gift and an estate tax, in which case a credit against the estate tax was provided
for any gift tax paid.  Casner, supra, at 75.
21. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
Law Institute proposal to exempt all transfers for consumption (including
education and healthcare transfers) from gift taxation.  Part III provides a
partial estimate of the magnitude of wealth represented by human capital
transfers.  Part IV describes a lively debate between two economists that
illustrates the difficulty inherent in trying to categorize these transfers for gift
tax purposes.  Part IV also looks to various models of donor motivation to
assist in determining the proper gift tax treatment of education and healthcare
transfers.  Part V places the inquiry within a larger debate among liberal
egalitarian political theorists about the competing values of family autonomy
and equality of opportunity.  Part VI offers an alternative to the current
unlimited exclusion for tuition and medical care payments.  Part VII concludes
the article.
I. Background
The federal estate tax was enacted in 1916.17  The first federal gift tax was
imposed in 1924, primarily to serve as a backstop to the estate tax.18  The
current federal gift tax was enacted in 1932.19  Before 1976, the gift and the
estate taxes operated independently.20  The Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA)
unified the two taxes to ensure that the total transfer tax burden would be
approximately the same whether a donor transferred property during his or her
lifetime, at his or her death, or some combination of the two.21  TRA achieved
integration by applying a unified transfer-tax rate schedule to cumulative
transfersmade during life or at deathafter application of a single lifetime
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22. See id. § 2006, 90 Stat. at 1879-90.
23. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 12.01[1].
24. Countering these effects is the fact that gifts generally get a carry-over income tax basis
while bequests get a fair market value basis under current law.  See I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1015
(2006).  
25. REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS ¶ 1082 (23d
ed. 2006). 
26. Id.
27. See I.R.C. § 2503(b); see also Robert B. Smith, Should We Give Away the Annual
Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 361, 382 (1993) (discussing how the annual exclusion can also
be thought of as an exception to the estate tax and, under certain circumstances, an exception
to the generation-skipping transfer tax).
28. I.R.C. § 2503(b).  The inflation-adjusted annual exclusion amount for 2009 was
$13,000.  Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, 1113-14, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-irbs/irb08-45.pdf. 
29. See I.R.C. § 2503(e).
30. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).  For the tuition and medical care payment
exclusion, see id. § 441(b), 95 Stat. at 319.
exemption amount, which allowed a certain amount of transfers to pass tax-
free.22  TRA also introduced a generation-skipping transfer tax designed to
ensure that all property was subject to federal wealth transfer taxation at least
once per generation.23
Although the gift and estate taxes have shared the same marginal rate
schedule since 1976, the effective tax rate imposed on gifts is lower than that
imposed on estates because their respective tax bases are different.24  Estates
are taxed on a tax-inclusive basis, meaning that the tax base includes the
amount that will go toward paying the tax.25  By contrast, gifts are taxed on a
tax-exclusive basis, meaning that the marginal rates are applied to the net
amount received by the transferee, not including the gift tax paid with respect
to such amount.26  The annual per donee exclusion, codified in § 2503(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), is another salient feature exclusive to the
gift tax that reduces the base subject to the unified transfer-tax rate schedule.27
This provision allows a donor to exclude from gift taxation the first $10,000,
adjusted for inflation, of transfers made to any individual during the taxable
year.28
Another base-reducing feature available only for gift tax purposes is the
exclusion for certain tuition and medical care payments made on behalf of any
donee during the taxable year.29  This exclusion was enacted as part of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).30  ERTA significantly reduced
the incidence of the federal wealth transfer taxes by, inter alia, increasing the
lifetime estate and gift tax exemption incrementally from $175,625 to
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31. Id. § 401, 95 Stat. at 299.  Technically, the lifetime exemption is called the applicable
exclusion amount and takes the form of a credit against tax rather than an exclusion from tax.
See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 2505 (2006).  The credit is referred to as the
unified credit.  Id.  Prior to ERTA, the unified credit amount was $47,000, which effectively
exempted $175,625 of cumulative transfers from transfer taxation.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF
1981, at 227 (Comm. Print 1981). ERTA incrementally increased the unified credit amount over
a six-year period to $192,800, which effectively exempted $600,000 of cumulative transfers.
Id. at 228.  Well-advised married couples can effectively double their unified credit amounts.
See Smith, supra note 27, at 372 n.31 (describing how to accomplish this result).
32. Economic Recovery Tax Act § 441(a), 95 Stat. at 319.  The exclusion remained fixed
at $10,000 until 1998, but was indexed for inflation thereafter in $1000 increments.  I.R.C. §
2503(b)(2).  Married couples can effectively transfer up to two times the annual exclusion to
any donee in any year.  See Smith, supra note 27, at 378 (describing how married couples can
accomplish this result).
33. Economic Recovery Tax Act § 403, 95 Stat. at 301 (relevant provisions codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523).
34. Id. § 402, 95 Stat. at 300.  See generally Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1983) (discussing the legislative history,
impact, and structure of ERTA).
35. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2210, 2664 (2006)).  All of the provisions under
EGTRRA are subject to the Acts sunset provision and will automatically expire on their own
terms on December 31, 2010, unless an intervening Congress extends them or makes them
permanent.  Id. § 901(a), 115 Stat. at 150.
36. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 9.01.
37. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act § 521 (a), (b), 115 Stat. at 71-72
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505 (2006)).
38. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
$600,000;31 increasing the per donee annual gift tax exclusion from $3000 to
$10,000;32 enacting an unlimited estate and gift tax deduction for certain
intraspousal transfers;33 and reducing the unified marginal rates of tax.34
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA) repealed the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes for
decedents dying and generation-skipping transfers made after December 21,
2009.35  The gift tax, however, remains in effect to serve as a backstop to the
income tax.36  During the period leading up to repeal, EGTRRA also deunified
the estate and gift taxes by freezing the lifetime exemption for gift tax
purposes at $1,000,000, but allowing the estate and generation-skipping-
transfer tax exemption amounts to increase from $1,000,000 in 2002 to a
maximum of $3,500,000 in 2009.37
The ERTA education and healthcare exclusion was codified as § 2503(e)
of the IRC.  Section 2503(e) provides that certain tuition and medical care
payments are not treated as transfers of property by gift.38  Unlike the per
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39. See id.
40. Id. § 2503(e)(2)(A)-(B).
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 193 (1981); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(a) (1984).
42. The legislative history indicates that the annual exclusion was intended to obviate the
necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts . . . [and] to fix the
amount sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasional
gifts of relatively small amounts.  S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 41 (1932).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 193.
44. I.R.C. § 2512(b).
45. Commr v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).  
46. Love and affection are not considered consideration in money or moneys worth.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
donee gift tax annual exclusion, there is no limit on the amount that can be
excluded under this provision.39  However, amounts covered by the exclusion
are limited to tuition paid to an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and amounts paid to any person who provides medical care
(as defined in section 213(d)) . . . as payment for such medical care.40
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the tuition and
medical expense exclusion to be available in addition to the per donee annual
exclusion.41  This suggests that these two provisions serve independent
purposes.  Historically, the per donee gift tax annual exclusion rested on
notions of administrative convenience.42  By contrast, in enacting § 2503(e),
Congress was concerned that certain payments of tuition made on behalf of
children who have attained their majority, and medical expenses on behalf of
elderly relatives [were] technically considered gifts under [then-existing]
law.43
The technical gift resulted from two factors: the donor (1) gratuitously
paid the tuition or medical expenses (2) on behalf of someone to whom he
owed no legal obligation of support.  The IRC provides that [w]here property
is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
moneys worth, the difference between the amount transferred and the
consideration received shall be deemed a gift.44  Although ostensibly
addressing only the valuation of gifts, this standard was interpreted by the
Supreme Court to be the test for determining if a gift occurred.45  Accordingly,
the payment of another individuals tuition or medical expenses without
offsetting consideration in the form of money or moneys worth was
considered a gift.46
There is a doctrinal exemption available for medical and educational
payments made on behalf of someone whom the transferor is legally obligated
to support.  The doctrine considers the discharge of the legal support
obligation resulting from such payments as adequate and full consideration in
230 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:223
47. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 10.02[5].  Although there is no IRC or Code of
Federal Regulations section directly on point, a proposed regulation issued shortly after the
enactment of the 1954 version of the IRC, which was never incorporated into the final
regulations, expressly provided for this result.  See id.; see also Milton L. Ray, The Transfer-
for-Consumption Problem: Support and the Gift Tax, 59 OR. L. REV. 425, 437 (1981)
(hypothesizing that the omission of the proposed language from the final regulations was
because the rule seemed obvious or because the Treasury was unwilling to face problems
involving the scope of the amicable family legal obligation).
48. See 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 121.5 (2d ed. 1989).
49. See Smith, supra note 27, at 396-98.  
50. Am. Law Inst., Recommendations with Respect to Federal Estate and Gift Taxation,
in A.L.I. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at 5, 19.
51. See Smith, supra note 27, at 397 (suggesting that certain transfers for support can
surely be so luxurious as to involve a gift element); see also CHARLES T. STEWART, JR.,
INEQUALITY AND EQUITY 51 (1998) (noting the difficulty in drawing the line between inter
vivos transfers and costs of bringing up children, and suggesting that the line has moved as
societal norms about parental financial responsibility have evolved in light of the increasing
population of high-school graduates attending college).
52. Ray, supra note 47, at 428 (restating the general rule that the duty to support a child
ends upon emancipation of the child, upon the childs achieving legal age, entering military
service, or getting married).
53. But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 4400 (West 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-27 (2004)
(both imposing on adult children a legal obligation to support parents who cannot support
themselves).
money or moneys worth.47 Generally, a taxpayer has a legal duty to support
his or her spouse and minor children.48  Accordingly, payments for the
education and healthcare of a spouse or minor child are generally not
considered gifts.  By contrast, these same transfers made on behalf of an adult
child or elderly relative, neither of whom the transferor is legally obligated to
support, are gifts.
While this technical result was generally accepted, it presented problems
at the margins.49  For one, the existence and extent of support obligations were
determined under local law, which [was] neither uniform nor clear on this
matter.50  Thus, the same support-type transfer made to the same transferee
might have different gift tax consequences depending on applicable local law.
Even more problematic from an enforcement standpoint was the determination
of where support ended and a gift began.51  For example, was private school
tuition for a minor child considered a gift to the extent that it exceeded the
level of support required by local law?  
What was clear is that at a certain point, an individuals legal obligation to
provide support for her children ended.52  In addition, in most states, there was
no legally imposed duty to care for elderly relatives.53  Accordingly, before
enactment of § 2503(e), any support-type transfers to a child of age or an
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54. See I.R.C. § 6019 (2006) (requiring that a gift tax return be filed in any calendar year
that a taxpayer makes inter vivos transfers other than, inter alia, transfers covered by subsections
(b) and (e) of § 2503).
55. Gutman, supra note 34, at 1204-05 (noting that the task force made its proposal without
the benefit of hearings or public comment).
56. H.R. 2324, 97th Cong. (1981). 
57. Id.
58. See Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 5-6.
59. Id.  This was part of the ALIs larger project to review the existing federal estate and
gift taxes and to suggest improvements not only to surmount their purely technical deficiencies
but also to enhance the fairness and the wisdom of the policies that they are shaped to serve.
Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to A.L.I. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 20, at vii, vii.
elderly parent were technically gifts, and the only gift tax shelter available
was the annual exclusion.  To the extent that these transfers exceeded the
annual exclusion, the taxpayer was required to file a gift tax return to take
advantage of his or her available unified credit or to report and pay any gift tax
due.54
A gift tax exclusion for medical and educational expenses originally
appeared in the ERTA legislative history as part of a proposal by a special task
force convened by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1981 to address
proposed changes to the transfer taxes.55  On March 4, 1981, Representative
Pickle, one of the members of that task force, introduced a bill to increase the
annual gift tax exclusion and to clarify the gift tax treatment of certain
transfers for consumption.56  The bill proposed the exclusion of certain
consumption-type transfers from gift taxation, including payments of another
persons educational, medical, and dental costs.57  The broad transfer-for-
consumption gift tax exception proposed by Representative Pickle derived
from a recommendation made by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1969.58
Although Congress enacted only a subpart of the ALI/Pickle proposals, many
of the current theories underpinning § 2503(e) derive from those espoused by
the ALI.  Accordingly, the next section describes the ALI proposal and
critiques several of the rationales offered in support thereof. 
II. ALI Proposal
In 1969, the ALI adopted a resolution recommending the adoption of a
transfer-for-consumption exception to the gift tax.59  The resolution provided
as follows:
An expenditure should be excluded from transfer taxation as a
lifetime transfer . . . if the expenditure is for:
(a) the benefit of any person residing in the transferors
household, or the benefit of a child of the transferor under 21 years
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60. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 5-6.  
61. Id.
62. See Gutman, supra note 34, at 1243 (noting that transfers described in the ALI proposal
could be characterized as consumption by the transferor, even though such transfers relieve
the transferee of the need to expend his or her own resources for the described purposes); see
also Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1025-26 (2008-2009) [hereinafter Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax]
(arguing that payments of support are not true wealth transfers because (a) the payor controls
the spending, and (b) support entails current consumption (as opposed to wealth accumulation)
by the recipient).  
63. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
64. See Robert G. Popovich, Support Your Family but Leave Out Uncle Sam: A Call for
of age, whether or not he resides in the transferors household,
provided that such expenditure does not result in such person or
child acquiring property which will retain significant value after the
passage of one year from the date of such expenditure; or
(b) current educational, medical or dental costs of any person; or
(c) current costs of food, clothing and maintenance of living
accommodations of any person in fact dependent on the transferor,
in whole or in part, for support, provided such expenditure is
reasonable in amount.60
While couched in terms of consumption, this resolution actually represented
a proposal to exempt three distinct types of transfers: transfers for
consumption, transfers for support, and human capital transfers.  
A. Transfers for Consumption (Donors Own Consumption)
Under the ALI proposal, expenditures for the benefit of members of the
transferors household and children of the transferor under the age of twenty-
one were excluded from taxation if they did not result in the acquisition of
property which will retain significant value after the passage of one year from
the date of such expenditure (subsection (a) exclusion).61  Nonsignificant-
value property transfers would include transfers that purchase consumption on
behalf of another.  
Although the ALI was not explicit on this point, others have argued that
intrahousehold consumption should be excluded from the transfer tax base
because it represents consumption by the donor.62  The federal transfer taxes
do not attach to wealth consumed by the transferor for his or her own benefit
during his or her lifetime.  Consumption purchased on behalf of another,
however, is taxable to the purchaser if the purchase does not discharge any
legal obligation of support.63  Intrahousehold consumption creates problems
because it is not always clear who benefits from the consumption.64  According
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Federal Gift Tax Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 343, 376-80 (1996).  
65. INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION:
REPORT OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PROFESSOR J.E. MEADE 347 (1978).
66. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1397-98 (1975).
67. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
68. See Gutman, supra note 34, at 1188-89.
69. C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 9-15 (2d ed. 2008).  Another
purpose of the income tax is to implement social policy.  Id. at 6.
70. Cf. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE
L.J. 283, 294 (1994) (arguing, inter alia, that the estate tax encourages large-scale consumption
by the donor and that such consumption is problematic on liberal first principles).  But see
Smith, supra note 27, at 401 (suggesting that the gift tax system should protect payments made
pursuant to a moral obligation and consumed by the transferee).
71. See Dickman v. Commr, 465 U.S. 330, 340-42 (1984).  The benefit of catching all
inter vivos family gifts may be small because of the availability of the gift tax annual exclusion
and the gift tax unified credit.  Ray, supra note 47, at 426-27.
to the distinguished Meade Committee, [I]n general it is impossible to
allocate personal consumption between members of a family.65  Indeed, the
availability of a dependency exemption and the pooling of a childs income
with that of the parent is an implicit partial adoption by the federal income tax
of the Meade Committees insight.66
While this insight certainly has force when one attempts to allocate income
among a family or household unit, its impact in the transfer tax area is less
clear.  The only intrahousehold transfers for consumption subject to gift
taxation are those that exceed the annual exclusion made to persons to whom
the transferor owes no legal obligation of support.67  Presumably, the problem
of tracing would be minimized when allocating such large-scale consumption
to adult beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the normative foundations of the federal wealth transfer taxes
are different from those of the federal income tax.  As discussed in more detail
below, the federal estate and gift taxes attempt to reduce concentrations of
wealth harmful to liberty and equality of opportunity.68  The federal income
tax, on the other hand, is designed to raise revenue in the fairest and most
efficient manner possible.69  Donor-financed large-scale consumption may be
as problematic from a social policy perspective as large-scale wealth
transfers.70  An individuals opportunity set is surely substantially enhanced by
the provision of every educational, cultural, and social advantage money can
buy.  Perhaps the ALIs real concern was that the systematic costs of intruding
into family life necessary to police all consumption-related intrahousehold
gifts may be too great to justify the small benefit.71
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72. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 6.
73. This interpretation gives independent meaning to subsection (c) by preventing overlap
with subsection (a).
74.  Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 6.
75. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 15-16 (3d ed. 1993); Theodore W.
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1961).
76. Schultz, supra note 75, at 1.
B. Transfers for Support (Consumption Purchased on Behalf of Another)
The ALI proposal also excluded from gift taxation reasonable payments for
the current costs of food, clothing, and shelter made on behalf of persons
dependent on the transferor for support (subsection (c) exclusion).72  Purchases
of food, clothing, and shelter are consumption-type expenses.  Nevertheless,
the doctrinal rationale hypothesized for the subsection (a) exclusion (donors
own consumption) does not apply here because subsection (c) dependents
presumably live in separate households.73  Rather, the ALI proposal labeled
basic consumption items purchased on behalf of another (who was neither the
legal object of support of the donor nor the de facto object of support of the
donor by reason of sharing the same household) as support and excluded
payments for those items from gift taxation if the recipient was in fact
dependent on the donor. 
C. Human Capital Transfers
The ALI resolution also excluded any payments for the current educational,
medical, and dental expenses of any person (subsection (b) exclusion).74  As
a descriptive matter, the transfers described in the subsection (b) exclusion
differ from those described in the subsection (a) and (c) exclusions.  First,
subsection (b) conveyances were excludable no matter on whose behalf they
were paid, as long as the transfers were for one of the statutorily prescribed
purposes.  Second, they were not limited to an amount that was reasonable
or of insignificant value.  In other words, the ALI categorically excluded
certain types of consumption (or support, if paid on behalf of someone outside
the transferors household) transfers from the gift tax base.
In addition, one could argue that the transfers described in the subsection
(b) exclusion are not consumption at all, or at least only partly consumption.
Direct expenditures on education and healthcare, among other things, are
characterized by economists as investments in human capital rather than
consumption.75  Theodore Schultz, one of the innovators in the economic study
of human capital, remarked, Much of what we call consumption constitutes
investment in human capital.76  There is no bright-line rule for distinguishing
between consumption and investment payments.  Expenditures that affect
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81. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 19-20.
82. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
83. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 19.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 19-20. 
86. Id. at 19.
87. Morgan v. Commr, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
particular human capabilities to do productive work are considered
investments,77 whereas those expenses that merely satisfy consumer
preferences and in no way enhance [productive] capabilities are considered
consumption.78  Many expenditures are part-consumption and part-
investment.79  Expenditures on education and healthcare, along with
expenditures on most other relevant activities, fall into the last class.80
D. Rationales
In supporting its transfer-for-consumption proposal, the ALI indicated that
it was attempting to bring uniformity to the law pertaining to the legal
obligation of support.81  Recall that differences in local law affect whether and
to what extent a gift occurred if a transfer was made to satisfy an obligation of
support owed to the transferee.82 The ALI correctly observed that local law
[was] neither uniform nor clear on this matter.83  This lack of state-law
uniformity raised a problem with respect to evenhanded application of the
federal gift tax laws because it resulted in unequal gift tax treatment of
transferors making identical support-type transfers in different jurisdictions.84
One purpose of the ALI proposal was to eliminate the significance of
differences in local law as to what constitute[d] a legal obligation to support
another.85  The ALI proposal accomplished this by excluding covered
transfers without regard to whether they in fact involve[d] a discharge of a
legal obligation to support.86
The ALIs uniformity rationale carries very little weight when viewed in the
context of the federal wealth transfer tax system as a whole, which does not
treat the variable tax consequences resulting from differences in local law as
particularly problematic.  Local-law differences are inherent in the federal
wealth transfer tax system.  According to the Supreme Court, State law
creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what
interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.87  Accordingly, characterizations
of various property interests may differ depending on applicable state law,
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88. For example, whether a power of appointment is subject to an ascertainable standard
so that it is exempt from estate taxation under I.R.C. § 2041 depends on state law.  STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 4.13[4][a].  Substantive state-law differences can result in inconsistent
estate tax results.  Compare, e.g., Brantingham v. United States, 631 F.2d 542, 543, 547 (7th
Cir. 1980) (holding that under Massachusetts law maintenance, comfort and happiness was
an ascertainable standard), with Whelan v. United States, Civil No. 78-0800-N, 1980 WL 1759,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1980) (holding that under California law support, care and comfort
was not an ascertainable standard).
89. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (2006) (giving a fair market value basis to both
halves of community property on the death of the predeceasing spouse), with I.R.C. §
1014(b)(9) (giving a fair market value basis only to the one-half interest of jointly held property
that is includable in the predeceasing spouses gross estate in a common-law property state).
90. See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
91. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 19.  Presumably, this comment was aimed at the
subsection (c) exclusion.  The subsection (a) and subsection (b) exclusions were not limited to
charitable-type payments, but rather to pure consumption by a household member or child of
a donor (subsection (a)), or investment in a donees human capital (subsection (b)).  See supra
text accompanying note 60.
92. See I.R.C. § 2522.
93. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 18, ¶ 11.02.  This omission of individual-to-individual
transfers from the charitable deduction helps to ensure that the gift tax fulfills its function as a
backstop to the estate tax.  See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal
Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 268 n.17 (2007).
resulting in variable transfer tax consequences.88  In addition, disparities in
transfer tax treatment still exist between common-law property states and
community property states.89
Furthermore, the ALI proposal not only attempted to harmonize the legal
obligation of support doctrine but also to extend it.  In particular, it allowed
gift tax-free transfers to persons to whom the transferor owed no legal
obligation of support under any states law.  This group of transferees included
nonminor, nonspouse (1) members of the transferors household; (2)
dependents of the transferor; and (3) individuals whose current educational,
medical, or dental expenses were paid by the transferor.90
The ALI also indicated that it was responding to a common
misunderstanding about the gift tax consequences of responding to the needs
of various persons for help; of responding to personalized charity as
distinguished from public charity.91  This public versus private charity
distinction is an important one.  Section 2522 of the IRC allows an unlimited
gift tax deduction for transfers to certain qualified charitable organizations.92
A transfer from one individual to another individual for a charitable purpose,
however, does not qualify for the deduction.93  Accordingly, it seems relatively
clear that rather than clarifying a misunderstanding about the gift tax, the
ALI was attempting to introduce into it an entirely new concept that would
require justifying tax-free transfers by reference to need on the part of the
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94. See Alstott, Family Values, supra note 12, at pt. V, para. 3 (suggesting that the law of
inheritance and federal wealth transfer taxation would look very different if we were to take
seriously the ideal of the family as a source of insurance against financial hardship).  More
specifically, Alstott posits that inheritance law might require . . . family members to leave their
wealth to the neediest members, a proposition which most would deem an unacceptable
incursion on testamentary freedom.  Id. at para. 4.
95. In contrast, under a transferee-based wealth transfer tax, such as an inheritance or
accessions tax, the economic situation of the donee would inherently be taken into account.
There have been some recent proposals to replace our current transferor-based system with a
transferee-based tax on wealth transfers.  See generally Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax, supra
note 62; Batchelder, supra note 2.
96. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 20.
97. A gift for income tax purposes depends on the intent of the donor.  Commr v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960).  Donative intent is generally irrelevant in determining
whether a gift occurred for gift tax purposes, although lack of donative intent is relevant in
determining whether the ordinary course of business gift tax exception applies.  Treas. Reg. §§
25.2511-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1997), 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
98. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006).
99. See Popovich, supra note 64, at 377 & n.161 (arguing that the ALI proposal to exclude
transfers for consumption does not violate the social policy against large wealth accumulations
because such transfers do not result in sustained wealth accumulation in the donee).
100. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (adopting a freeing of
donee.94  Under a transferor-based tax system such as the gift tax, however, the
donees financial situation should be irrelevant to determining the tax
consequences for the donor.95
The ALI also suggested that its proposal would exclud[e] typical transfers
that are motivated by considerations other than the build-up of wealth in the
transferee.96  It is not clear, however, why the subjective intention of the
transferor should matter.  Unlike the income tax definition of gift, the
transfer tax definition of gift is generally not concerned with the subjective
motivations of the donor.97  The gift tax reaches all transfer[s] of property by
gift, without any examination of why the gift was made.98
Another possible interpretation of this statement, one that does not require
resort to the subjective motivations of the donor, is that to the extent that a
gratuitous transfer is immediately consumed by the transferee, there is no
continuing wealth to be concerned about from a social policy perspective.99
While there may be some merit to this view with regard to subsection (c)
transfers for reasonable basic support, it is not clear that there is no social
policy concern with regard to unequal, gratuitously acquired large-scale
consumption.100  Moreover, to the extent that payment by the donor relieves
the donee of an expense that he or she would otherwise have been obligated
to pay, the donee is materially better off because current or future assets are
not encumbered by such obligation.101
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assets theory under the income tax for purposes of finding cancellation of indebtedness income).
102. Obviously, the amount invested will not accurately measure the value of what the donee
receives.  The actual increase in human capital will depend on the individual donees ability and
effort.  The potential mismatch between the amount invested and the resulting increase in
human capital led Theodore Schultz to claim that human capital is best measured by its yield
(increase in earnings) rather than its cost.  Schultz, supra note 75, at 8. 
103. Cf. BECKER, supra note 75, at 274 (noting that gifts of assets to children do not rise
rapidly until marginal rates of return on investments in children [i.e., in human capital] are
reduced to the rate on assets).
104. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 19.
105. See Ray, supra note 47, at 425-27.
Furthermore, the significance of the human capital characterization for
subsection (b) transfers is that it negates the claim that there is no buildup of
wealth in the transferee under the ALI proposal.  When material transfers
purchase education and healthcare for the donee, the donees earning capacity
and, thus, human capital are potentially increased.102  In other words, in
subsection (b) transfers, material wealth is transformed, in part at least, into
human wealth rather than completely consumed.  The return on human capital,
especially when the investment occurs early in the donees lifetime, may be far
greater than the return on an initially equivalent transfer of material wealth.103
This suggests that from a social policy perspective there may be reason to be
more concerned about human capital transfers than material transfers.
Finally, the ALI cited the fact that [i]t [was] not generally understood by
the average person that a gift tax [might] be payable if he provide[d] a child
with educational benefits beyond those he [was] legally obligated to provide,
or if he pa[id] a sick relatives doctors bill.104  This lack of public
understanding had led to widespread noncompliance with the law and a
general lack of enforcement on the part of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).105
In summary, the following considerations informed the ALI when it adopted
its resolution recommending a transfer-for-consumption exception to the gift
tax: First, uniformity in application of the federal wealth transfer tax laws is
a desirable goal.  Second, gratuitously transferred consumption should be
excluded from the transfer tax base, especially (1) when it flows from affinity
in living quarters or the donors desire to satisfy the donees basic needs, or (2)
when it takes the form of education, medical, or dental care.  Finally, a lack of
recognition of these issues on the part of the federal wealth transfer tax system
had led to noncompliance and nonenforcement.
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106. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 § 441(b), 95 Stat. 172, 319
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2006)).
107. Officially, Congress increased the annual exclusions [i]n view of the substantial
increases in price levels since [1942].  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 273 (Comm. Print
1981).  This does not contradict the argument in the text because Congress was not specific
about what price levels increased.  See id.; see also Gutman, supra note 34, at 1246 (suggesting
that the dollar amount of the per donee gift tax exclusion would be affected by how support-
type payments, other than those for tuition and medical expenses, are treated); Smith, supra
note 27, at 401 (stating that [t]he desire to permit support-type transfers to be made without
fear of gift tax consequences . . . pressured Congress to make the annual exclusion large enough
to obviate such fears).
108. See, e.g., Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues:  Hearing on S. 23, S. 395, S. 404, S. 557,
S. 574, S. 858 and S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of the Comm. on
Finance, 97th Cong. 184 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of John A. Wallace, American
College of Probate Counsel) (The College also supports a substantially increased per donee
annual gift tax exclusion, but does not support an expansion of the exclusion by exempting
transfers of property for current consumption.); id. at 316, 319 (statement of Robert M.
Bellatti, Chairman, Illinois State Bar Association) (The $3,000 amount now does not allow a
parent to give a child an American made car or even to pay for a year of college tuition at many
schools . . . .); id. at 343, 359-60 (statement of Malcolm A. Moore, Atty, Davis, Wright, Todd,
Riese & Jones) (I believe that the gift tax annual exclusion should be substantially
increased. . . . [I]n most cases an automobile cannot be given to a young adult by his parents
without exceeding the present exclusion limits.).  But see id. at 156, 175-76 (joint statement
of Harvie Branscomb, Jr. and John S. Nolan, Chairman and Chairman-Elect, Section of
Taxation, American Bar Association) (arguing for an increase in the annual exclusion, but also
arguing for a separate transfer-for-consumption exception).
109. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 6; see also id. at 20 (acknowledging that the proposed
E. Congressional Response
Under ERTA, Congress declined to implement all of these considerations
in the form of the broad transfer-for-consumption exclusion proposed by the
ALI.  Instead, Congress explicitly enacted only the narrow subsection (b)
exclusion for tuition and medical expense payments.106  Arguably, however,
Congress also implicitly adopted the transfer-for-consumption and transfer-
for-support portions of the ALI proposal in the form of an increased annual
exclusion.107  Most of the witnesses testifying before the Senate Finance
Committee in the hearings leading up to the passage of ERTA advocated an
increased annual exclusion as the remedy for the issues identified by the
ALI.108  Enactment in the form of an increased annual exclusion avoided many
of the borderline issues inherent in the ALI proposal, including questions
regarding what property will retain significant value after a year under
subsection (a), as well as what constitutes reasonable basic support and who
is in fact dependent on the transferor under subsection (c).109  Furthermore,
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exception [would] raise some difficult factual issues in borderline situations).  See Ray, supra
note 47, at 446-50, for further elaboration and a suggested solution to some of the inherent
indeterminacy in the ALI proposal.
110. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 6.
111. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
112. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 213.  Section 213 encompasses qualifying dental expenses.  Treas.
Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(ii) (as amended in 1979).
113. Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 20.
114. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 274 (Comm. Print 1981); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-
6(b)(2),(c) (1984).  Although the legislative history does not explain the purpose of the direct
payment requirement, presumably it was to avoid having to trace cash from the donor to the
donee to the qualified educational institution or healthcare provider. BITTKER &LOKKEN, supra
note 48, ¶ 121.5; accord Gutman, supra note 34, at 1243 n.173. Another possible explanation
for this restriction is that it keeps control over the payment in the hands of the donor.  A
beneficiary who receives $10,000 in cash has a full range of options available.  Such a
beneficiary can consume, invest, save, or give the money away.  If the beneficiary chooses to
use the money on education or healthcare, such beneficiary incurs an opportunity cost by not
choosing other uses of the funds.  By contrast, a beneficiary of a § 2503(e) transfer has no such
choice and bears no such opportunity cost.  This seems to suggest that because control over
payment of the expense is in the hands of the donor, it is really the donors consumption and
not the donees; thus, the payment should be excludable.  See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
115. Smith, supra note 27, at 385 (highlighting that Congress did not explain why it chose
to simultaneously increase the annual exclusion and create a new medical and tuition
exclusion).
Congresss solution avoided many of the doctrinal and policy-related questions
raised above.  
In addition to raising the general level of the gift tax annual exclusion,
Congress also enacted the subsection (b) exclusion of the ALI proposal, albeit
in a more limited form.  The ALI called for any educational, medical, or dental
expense to be excludable.110  Section 2503(e) excludes only tuition payments,
not all educational payments.111  The ALI would have excluded any medical
and dental expense payments, whereas § 2503(e) excludes only those expenses
that would qualify for the income tax deduction under § 213.112  Furthermore,
the ALI maintained that if a transfer was made for one of the statutorily
described purposes, it should be immaterial whether payment [was] made on
behalf of the transferee or to the transferee for the designated purposes.113  By
contrast, § 2503(e) excludes covered expenses only if they are paid directly to
a qualified educational organization or medical care provider.114
Although Congress did not explain why it chose a new exception in addition
to an annual exclusion increase rather than just the latter,115 one can construct
a rationale.  Tuition and healthcare are costly and irregular expenses, making
them particularly unsuitable candidates for annual exclusion coverage.
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116. But cf. id. at 391-400 (emphasizing that a significant amount of nonconsumption wealth
is inappropriately transferred under the current level of the annual exclusion).  
117. See supra note 7.
118. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2006) (excluding from taxable gifts amounts paid for tuition and
healthcare expenses on behalf of any person).
119. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
120. This is an important issue in and of itself, since the federal wealth transfer taxes are
designed to prevent undue accumulations of wealth.  If intergenerational transfers constitute an
insignificant part of accumulated wealth, this brings into question this policy-based justification
for the transfer taxes.  See Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life
Cycle Savings in the Accumulation of Wealth, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1988, at 15, 17 (making
a similar point).
121. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1988, at 41, 43.  Kotlikoffs figure derives from two earlier studies conducted with
Increasing the general level of the annual exclusion to capture these transfers
would set the exclusion at too high of a level and allow large amounts of
noneducation, nonhealthcare wealth transfers to escape taxation.116
Furthermore, even if Congress had raised the level of the annual exclusion in
1981 to capture most of these transfers, general inflation adjustments thereafter
would not have kept up with the annual increases in these costs.  Average
annual increases in college tuition and medical expenses have outpaced
inflation since the early 1980s.117
While it is easy to rationalize the form of the education and healthcare
exclusion, it is more difficult to articulate its normative justification.  It should
be noted at the outset that § 2503(e) achieved some of the uniformity called
for by the ALI.  Since passage of ERTA, no matter whom a state has required
a donor to support and no matter what level of support such state has required,
a tuition or medical expense payment has remained gift tax-free.118  As
explained above, however, the uniformity justification is of minimal
significance in the current system of federal wealth transfer taxation.119
Before this article explores the competing normative considerations in play
with regard to human capital transfers, the next two sections seek to provide
a rough estimate of the magnitude of the excluded transfers and to illustrate the
difficulty in categorizing these payments for transfer tax purposes.
III. Magnitude
The magnitude of human capital transfers is significant.  We can indirectly
derive an estimate by analyzing two studies that attempt to estimate the total
share of U.S. accumulated wealth attributable to intergenerational transfers as
opposed to savings from earned income (so-called life-cycle savings).120
Laurence Kotlikoff estimates that approximately 80% of all wealth
accumulation is due to gratuitous transfers.121  By contrast, Franco Modigliani
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Lawrence Summers, and is alternatively referred to as the Kotlikoff & Summers estimate.
See Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers
in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706  (1981); Laurence J. Kotlikoff &
Lawrence H. Summers, The Contribution of Intergenerational Transfers to Total Wealth: A
Reply (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W1827, 1988), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=227165.  Kotlikoff arrives at his figure indirectly by estimating savings
from earned income (nearly 22%) and then subtracting that estimate from an estimate
representing 100% of total wealth, yielding an estimate of inherited wealth (i.e., wealth
attributable to intergenerational transfers) that approaches 80%.  Kotlikoff, supra, at 41-44.
Kotlikoff uses a different method to arrive at a lower bound estimate of 46% as the share of
accumulated wealth represented by intergenerational transfers.  See id. at 45-46.  This second
method measures the annual flow of bequests and then uses an appropriate blow up factor to
infer the stock of inherited wealth.  See id. at 44-46.  Kotlikoff acknowledges several problems
with using this second method to arrive at the desired estimate, including the tendency of the
flow approach to overestimate life-cycle savings because of an absence of data on a variety
of transfer flows.  See id. at 45-46.
122. Modigliani, supra note 120, at 28 tbl.2B, 30 (adjusting the Kotlikoff estimates in light
of alternative definitions of life-cycle wealth and inherited wealth, and calling 20% a
consensus figure among various studies cited in the article).
123. See Kotlitkoff, supra note 121, at 47; see also Denis Kessler & André Masson, Bequest
and Wealth Accumulation: Are Some Pieces of the Puzzle Missing?, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1989, at 141, 142.
124. See Kessler & Masson, supra note 123, at 142.
125. Kotlikoff, supra note 121, at 47.
126. Id. at 47-48 (assuming that support of children under age eighteen is consumption by
the parent and thus not includable as an intergenerational transfer, but noting that the choice of
age eighteen as the age of majority for purposes of defining intergenerational transfers is
arbitrary).
127. Modigliani, supra note 120, at 30.
128. William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the
estimates that only about 20% of accumulated wealth is attributable to
intergenerational transfers.122
Part of the large discrepancy between the two figures results from differing
definitions of intergenerational transfers.123  In particular, the two studies
diverge on whether the value of lifetime transfers (as opposed to transfers at
death), including college tuition payments, should be included.124  Modigliani
includes only bequests at death and major lifetime gifts in his definition of
intergenerational transfers, excluding all minor lifetime gifts and college
tuition payments.125  In contrast, Kotlikoff treats all gratuitous transfers
received by children over the age of eighteen, including college tuition
payments, as intergenerational transfers.126
The amount of the difference between the two estimates attributable to the
inclusion of college expenditures is about 7.8% of aggregate net wealth.127  A
later study by Gale and Scholz concludes that payments for college expenses
represent approximately 12% of aggregate U.S. net wealth.128  Both of these
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Accumulation of Wealth, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 145, 152 tbl.4 (generating
calculations using ROBERT B. AVERY & ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL, ECON. BEHAVIOR PROGRAM,
UNIV. OF MICH. SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 1986 (1986)).
Gale and Scholz separate out college expenditures from other transfers because of the
controversy concerning whether they are appropriately regarded as a transfer.  Id. at 151
(citing the opposing positions of Modigliani and Kotlikoff on this issue).
129. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723, 729-36 (1988).
130. Id. at 736.  Langbeins findings may offer an alternative explanation for § 2503(e).  One
of the driving forces behind the ERTA changes to the federal wealth transfer taxes was
Congresss desire to remove the broad middle classes from their impact.  Gutman, supra note
34, at 1209-12 (questioning Congresss sincerity with regard to achieving this goal).  ERTA
accomplished this in a number of ways, including increasing the annual exclusion and the
unified credit.  See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.  Section 2503(e) could be
included on this list as well.  If human capital transfers make up the largest portion of wealth
transfers for the middle class, but only an insignificant portion of transfers for the ultrawealthy,
the consequence of exempting such transfers would be removal of upper-middle income
taxpayers from the reach of the federal wealth transfer taxes. 
figures almost certainly underestimate the amount of wealth represented by §
2503(e) transfers because they are dated and do not include the value of
medical expenses gratuitously paid on anothers behalf.
While these estimates illustrate that the total percentage of gratuitous
transfers represented by investments in human capital is large, they fail to
break down that percentage by income or wealth class.  In a seminal 1988
article, John Langbein argues that inter vivos investment in human capital is
the dominant form of wealth transfer among the broad middle classes.129  He
also recognizes that the impact of human wealth transfers on dynastic wealth
holders is probably not as significant.130  If education and healthcare
payments represent a de minimis portion of all inter vivos wealth transfers for
those otherwise subject to federal wealth transfer taxation (i.e., the
ultrawealthy), then § 2503(e) can be justified in terms of administrative
convenience.
IV. Definitional Issues and Donor Motivation Models
The lively debate between Kotlikoff and Modigliani over the propriety of
including college tuition expenditures in the definition of intergenerational
transfers highlights the difficulty inherent in categorizing these payments for
transfer tax purposes.  Kotlikoff includes college tuition payments in his
definition, reasoning as follows: 
[G]iven the fungibility of money there is no reasonable basis for
labeling parental tuition support differently from parental gifts of
durables, such as cars, or parental gifts of money; that is, whether
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131. Kotlikoff, supra note 121, at 47-48.
132. Id. at 47.
133. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part II.A-C.
135. Modigliani, supra note 120, at 31 (articulating a transfer-for-consumption rationale
virtually identical to that advanced by the ALI).
136. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86. 
the parent pays tuition or gives the child the money to pay tuition
is economically equivalent.  In addition, there is no reason, as
Modigliani suggests, to classify somehow educational expenditures
as a human as opposed to nonhuman wealth transfer.  The transfer
of funds to pay for education constitutes a transfer of nonhuman
capital.  The fact that the expenditure leads to smarter or more
skilled children, as opposed, for example, to fatter children, is quite
immaterial to the issue of tracing the origins of nonhuman wealth
accumulation.131
Kotlikoff clearly views the transaction from the perspective of the donor,
which aligns well with the approach of the transferor-based gift tax.  Under his
view, there is no difference between giving a beneficiary $10,000 in cash or
other property or paying $10,000 to a university as tuition for the beneficiary.
In either case, the donors estate is reduced by $10,000 with no consideration
received in money or moneys worth.  Kotlikoffs view represents the
straightforward case for inclusion of education and healthcare transfers in the
gift tax base.
Kotlikoff critiques Modiglianis approach as effectively treat[ing] any
adult, regardless of age, who received non-bequest transfers from his or her
parents, as a dependent and ascrib[ing] the consumption resulting from such
transfers to the parent(s).132  Interestingly, by including all transfers made to
children above the age of majority in the definition of intergenerational
transfers, Kotlikoff implicitly adopts the pre-ERTA transfer tax base.133
Modigliani, on the other hand, implicitly adopts the ALIs proposed transfer
tax base by excluding all consumption-type and college expenditures.134
Furthermore, Modigliani articulates many of the ALI rationales in defending
his position.  In particular, he asserts that the excluded transfers go to pay for
current consumption and do not represent an addition to the assets of the
recipient or society.135  He criticizes Kotlikoff for making his estimate
crucially dependent on the age of majority,136 a sentiment echoing the ALIs
uniformity rationale.137 Finally, Modigliani asserts that these types of
imputed transfers are quite different in nature from bequests and major gifts
because, unlike [those] transfers, they would be hard to modify through policy
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138. Modigliani, supra note 120, at 31.
139. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
140. Modigliani, supra note 120, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Gutman, supra note 34, at 1242 (noting that to the extent that § 2503(e)
covers education and healthcare payments to minor children, it merely codifies existing law,
but to the extent that it covers such payments to others, it may be too broad because it reaches
beyond the class of persons society could reasonably expect the donor to support).
144. See discussion infra Part V.
145. See Kessler & Masson, supra note 123, at 143.  In commenting on the Kotlikoff-
actions.138  This statement clearly aligns with the different motives behind
these transfers alluded to in the comments to the ALI proposal.139
With respect to college tuition payments, Modigliani recognizes that such
expenditures could be counted as gratuitous transfers, since they take the
form of an investment in human capital.140  He concludes, however, that this
characterization does not require one treatment or another.  Specifically, he
asserts that
this consideration would be relevant mainly for other issues, such
as the hereditary transmission of economic inequality or the
contribution of transfers to total capitalnonhuman and human.
Furthermore, . . . many other expenditures on human capital
[should be included], not necessarily only on behalf of dependents
18 years old and overlike all private schooling.  And why should
the line be drawn at schooling and not include all expenditure on
children?141
This quote illustrates the competing considerations in play when
categorizing these transfers for gift tax purposes.  On one hand, if we follow
Kotlikoff and reject as unhelpful the artificial label of consumption by the
donor, we must be willing to take that argument to its logical extreme.
Consequently, the doctrine of legal obligation of support would no longer
grant automatic immunity from gift taxation for many transfers for the benefit
of a minor.142  This approach would cast a broad net, and the resulting
intrusions into family life necessary to enforce such a rule may be too great to
justify the small benefit.143  On the other hand, if we follow Modigliani and
ignore all intrafamily human capital transfers, we cast the net too narrowly and
miss a large and important source of hereditarily transmitted economic
inequality.144
The characterization of college tuition payments as intergenerational wealth
transfers depends in large part on whether such payments are considered
substitutes for material bequests.145  Modigliani treats property bequests as
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Modigliani debate regarding the proper treatment of college expenditures, Kessler and Masson
ask the following question: Is it reasonable to assume separability between material bequests
and expenditures made on behalf of children?  Id.
146. See id.  Specifically, Kessler and Masson note that under Modiglianis life-cycle
hypothesis the bequest motive is considered in isolation and the process of asset accumulation
can be considered relatively apart from labor supply or family-related decisions.  Id.
147. See id.
148. See supra note 18.
149. Popovich, supra note 64, at 378 (explaining that [w]hen wealth is merely consumed
and not transferred, the gift taxs role as a backstop to the estate tax is not implicated).
150. Notice that this aligns nicely with the ALI rationale regarding the difference in
motivations for consumption-type transfers.  See supra text accompanying note 79.
151. See Kessler & Masson, supra note 123, at 143 (noting that complete substitutability
supposes also, on the recipient side, that college education has the same impact on later
accumulation as a cash transfer).  
152. Luc Arrondel et al., Bequest and Inheritance:  Empirical Issues and France-U.S.
Comparison, in IS INHERITANCE LEGITIMATE? 89, 119-20 (Guido Erreygers & Toon Vandevelde
eds., 1997).
153. See Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests?  The Distributive and Welfare
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 647-50 (1999).  
154. See André Masson & Pierre Pestieau, Bequest Motives and Models of Inheritance:  A
Survey of the Literature, in IS INHERITANCE LEGITIMATE?, supra note 152, at 54, 63-64
(providing a formula for an altruistic individuals utility function that includes a term for the
consumption of both the individual and the individuals child).
155. Fried, supra note 153, at 647.  The psychological literature would call this empathy
differing in kind from inter vivos human capital transfers.146  Kotlikoff, on the
other hand, assumes substitutability between material transfers and payments
for an adult childs college education.147  The implications of the
substitutability assumption from a gift tax perspective relate back to the
function of the gift tax as a backstop to the estate tax.148  Under one
interpretation of this function, the gift tax need only be concerned about inter
vivos transfers motivated by a desire to reduce estate taxation.149  Thus, only
gifts that are perfect substitutes for bequests should be included in the tax
base.150
As recognized by Kessler and Masson, substitutability depends on two
factors: (1) the motivation of the donor in making the transfer and (2) the
donees position after the transfer.151  While there is much debate in economic
circles over donors motives in making gifts, two dominant models have
emerged, namely, altruism and exchange.  The altruism model surfaced during
the 1970s and 1980s.152  Under this model, a donor derives utility from the
donees increased utility resulting from the transfer.153  Accordingly, the
donors utility function includes a term for the recipients welfare.154  The idea
is that we make transfers to family members on purpose, because it makes us
happy to make them happy.155  This implies that parents will make
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or an other-oriented emotional response . . . congruent with the perceived welfare of someone
else.  C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Altruism, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
485, 486 (C.R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002).
156. Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 62.
157. See Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families,
in BECKER, supra note 75, at 257. 
158. Id. at 263; Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 62-63.
159. Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 62-63; Becker & Tomes, supra note 157, at 274.
160. Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 62-63; Becker & Tomes, supra note 157, at 274.
161. See Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 63.  The result for many middle-income
parents is that intergenerational transfers are made solely in the form of human capital.  See
Langbein, supra note 129, at 736 (describing this phenomenon in the real world).
162. Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 62.
163. See Becker & Tomes, supra note 157, at 277.
164. See Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 63.
165. See Becker & Tomes, supra note 157, at 263 (indicating that [p]arents must decide
how to allocate their total bequest to children between human capital and assets).
consumption and savings decisions taking into account not only their own
needs, but also those of their children.156
Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes were the first to model the decision matrix
of altruistically-inclined parents.157  Under their model, parents transfer
resources to children in two forms: (1) investments in human capital (which
increase the childrens wages) and (2) material transfers (which increase the
childrens wealth and nonwage income).158  Parents first invest in the childs
human capital until the return on education equals that on material capital.159
Thereafter, the parents intergenerational transfers take the form of gifts or
bequests of material assets.160  Liquidity-constrained parents will give priority
to education transfers where the return is higher, and will transfer material
assets only after the optimal amount of human capital has been reached.161
The goal of altruistically-inclined parents is to level out consumption
between and within generations.162  Intergenerationally, parents will use
material wealth transfers to offset regression toward the mean between their
earnings and their childrens earnings.163  Intragenerationally, given different
talents and abilities, different children will receive a different mix of the two
types of transfers.164  Overall, under the altruism model, all children will enjoy
a standard of living similar to that of their siblings and parents.
Under the Becker and Tomes altruism model, from the parents perspective,
human capital and physical capital transfers are substitutes.165  This suggests
that under a transferor-based tax, such as the gift tax, both types of transfers
should be taxed similarly.  If, as under current law, only material capital
transfers are subject to the gift tax, it may lead to inefficient overinvestment
in education and healthcare.  Furthermore, intragenerational equity will be
disturbed in a perverse way.  If, as most models assume, the economic burden
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166. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder & Surachai Khitatrakun, Dead or Alive: An Investigation
of the Incidence of Estate Taxes and Inheritance Taxes 2 (3d Annual Conference on Empirical
Legal Studies Papers, Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134113 (suggesting
that the economic burden of wealth transfer taxes is generally borne by the donee).
167. See Luc Arrondel & André Masson, Family Transfers Involving Three Generations,
103 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 415, 420-21 (2001).  
168. Id. at 420.
169. Id.  Adult children in their early working lives tend to be liquidity-constrained because
of imperfect capital or insurance markets.  Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. 
172. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 134.
173. See Arrondel & Masson, supra note 167, at 420; see also supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
174. Arrondel & Masson, supra note 167, at 420.
of the gift tax is borne by the donee,166 the less-talented child will find his or
her compensatory material wealth transfers reduced by the amount of the tax,
whereas the parents investment in the human capital of the more-talented
child will remain unchanged (or will increase).  Overall, the child with more
ability will receive more from the parents than the child with less ability.
Accordingly, if the condition of substitutability exists, both types of wealth
transfers should be included in the gift tax base.
Luc Arrondel and André Masson question the substitutability assumption
inherent in the altruism model by focusing on the differing effect each type of
transfer has on the donees economic situation.167  Investments in human
capital (education) that come earlier in the donees life increase the donees
lifetime income.168  Financial assistance to liquidity-constrained [adult]
children during their early working lives primarily increases the donees
consumption.169  Inter vivos transfers . . . received later in life, and tak[ing]
the form of stocks rather than regular flows, are a form of early inheritance
that increase the childs wealth.170
Arrondel and Masson explicitly recognize that their critique of the
substitutability assumption is reminiscent of the Kotlikoff-Modigliani
debate.171  Modigliani includes only the third category of inter vivos transfers
(wealth transfers) in his definition of gratuitous transfers.172  Kotlikoff,
however, includes all three types of transfers (education, assistance, and
wealth) in his estimate of gratuitously transferred wealth.173  Given the
differing purposes and timing of the transfers and the differing economic
effects on the donee, Arrondel and Masson observe that most economists favor
Modiglianis approach because of the limited degree of substitutability
between education transfers and financial assistance, on the one hand, and
wealth gifts on the other.174  It is important to note, however, that unlike
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175. See Modigliani, supra note 120, at 38-39.
176. See Fried, supra note 153, at 647-49.  The altruism model suggests that donors should
gift early and often, rather than transfer assets at death.  Id. at 648.  Empirically, this has not
been the case.  See James Poterba, Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving
in the US, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 237, 247 & tbl. 4 (2001) (showing that taxable gifts comprise a
small fraction of the total wealth transferred through estates and gifts).  Moreover, bequests
tend to be shared equally rather than calibrated to the economic situation of the donee, which
cuts against the altruism model.  See Arrondel et al., supra note 152, at 112-13 (listing empirical
studies suggesting that equal sharing of inheritances is the norm in the United States).
Empirical evidence further suggests that inter vivos transfers are positively related to donees
incomes, which also contradicts altruism.  Donald Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers,
95 J. POL. ECON. 508, 524-25 (1987).  In addition, several studies find that, among families
where parents make transfers to children, a one-dollar increase in parents resources coupled
with a one-dollar reduction in childrens resources does not raise transfers by a dollar, although
it should under altruism.  William G. Gale & Maria G. Perozek, Do Estate Taxes Reduce
Saving?, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 216, 219 (William G. Gale et al. eds.,
2001).  The strongest empirical support for altruism remains in wealthy households, suggesting
that it may still have relevance in the federal wealth transfer tax area.  See Fried, supra note
153, at 648 & n.14 (citing studies giving some empirical support to altruism, particularly
among the wealthier income classes).
177. Masson & Pestieau, supra note 154, at 68.  See generally Donald Cox & Mark R. Rank,
Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 305 (1992).
The crucial difference between the two models from a public policy perspective is the extent
to which public transfers crowd out private transfers.  Id. at 305, 313.  If private transfers are
motivated by altruism, there will be a high degree of substitution between public and private
transfers.  See id. at 305.  On the other hand, if private transfers are motivated by exchange,
there will be little or no crowding out.  Id.
178. Fried, supra note 153, at 652; see also Arrondel & Masson, supra note 167, at 424-25
(discussing reciprocities in a three-generation model); see also Becker & Tomes, supra note
157, at 274.
Arrondel and Masson, Modigliani views the situation exclusively from the
perspective of the donor, treating college tuition payments as the donors own
consumption and rejecting the human capital characterization as unhelpful.175
The Becker and Tomes model of altruism did not play out as expected in the
real world.176  The models failure to adequately explain gratuitous-transfer
behavior led to the rise in importance of the bequest-as-exchange model,
which posits that parents care about some service or action undertaken by
their children especially to secure old-age needs, and that the education and
bequests are the payment for this service or action.177  This model assumes
some sort of implicit contract between generations based on reciprocity.178
Interestingly, under this model, the two types of § 2503(e) transfers, education
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179. See Lakshmi K. Raut & Lien H. Tran, Parental Human Capital Investment and Old-
Age Transfers from Children: Is It a Loan Contract or Reciprocity for Indonesian Families?,
77 J.DEV.ECON.389, 390-91 (2005) (describing existing models linking parental human-capital
investment to old-age transfers from children).  Raut and Tran formulated two models of inter
vivos transfers linking parental investment in the human capital of children with support
transfers from children to elderly parents: the pure loan model and the reciprocity model.  Id.
at 391.  Unlike the Becker and Tomes model, which assumes that children are selfish, these
models assume two-sided altruism.  Id.  Under the pure loan model, parents determine the level
of transfers flowing each way, and cultural and social norms enforce the contract.  Id.  In
contrast, under the reciprocity model, children determine how much to transfer to their parents
out of pure altruism, independent of considerations of cultural and/or social norms.  Id.  Rauts
and Trans results lend more support to the reciprocity model than to the loan model.  Id. at 412.
180. Id. at 391.
181. As with altruism, the empirical data with regard to exchange models have generated
mixed results.  Gale & Perozek, supra note 176, at 220.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53. 
183. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
184. The consideration for the childs transfer would be received before the childs transfer,
and the consideration for the parents transfer would be received after the parents transfer.
185. See I.R.C. § 6019 (2006) (requiring annual gift tax filing).
and healthcare, are linked.179  Parents pay for their childrens education, and
in return, adult children support their elderly parents.180
Under a long-term view, an exclusion from gift taxation is arguably justified
because each party to the implicit contract receives consideration.  In other
words, under the bequest-as-exchange model, there is no net transfer between
generations for the federal wealth transfer taxes to be concerned about.  This
argument is problematic for several reasons.181  First, not all education and
healthcare transfers are reciprocal.  Parents who pay for their childrens
education may never need financial assistance to pay medical bills later in life.
Even if parents do need such support, the children who received the education
may not be the same ones who later pay their parents medical bills.  Second,
even for reciprocal transfers, the implicit exchange contract is legally
unenforceable (barring a legal obligation of support imposed by state law on
either side).182  The obligation is a moral one, and enforcement is limited to the
honor system.  Unenforceable obligations are not recognized as consideration
under the gift tax scheme.183  Third, the exchange may not be closed for several
decades.  Under such circumstances, each partys consideration would be
received in a different tax year from that of the transfer.184  The gift taxs
annual accounting period cannot accommodate this situation absent a legally
enforceable debt obligation.185  Fourth, the amounts of the respective transfers
may be different, leading to a net wealth transfer in one direction subject to
gift taxation.  Finally, time value of money considerations would need to be
accounted for in comparing consideration given and received.  For all of these
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186. Gale & Perozek, supra note 176, at 221.
187. See id.  Other models of donor motivation include, inter alia, the capitalistic model
(under which very wealthy families are usually part of a self-sustained accumulation process,
children being primarily considered a means of achieving the desired path of wealth
accumulation); the retrospective model (under which one generation bequeaths in an amount
and form similar to the inheritance it received, resulting in bequeathing patterns [that] tend to
be reproduced from one generation to the next); and the paternalistic or bequest-as-
consumption model (under which a donor gives because he or she derives direct utility from
the size of the bequest, the latter being simply [a] luxury consumption good).  Arrondel et al.,
supra note 152, at 99.  Under another model, called the structural model, pre-estate-tax wealth
may enter the utility function as a separate argument, above and beyond the conventional
consumption goods it can finance, because wealth may also provide social status, power, social
connections, and so on.  Gale & Perozek, supra note 176, at 220.
188. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
189. See Fleischer, supra note 93, at 267-68 (arguing that estate tax base questions must be
resolved by reference to the social policy goals intended to be furthered); see also James R.
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity:  A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND.L.REV.1129,
1131 (2008) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity] (lamenting that [t]ax policy has
ignored the necessity of first identifying equity goals appropriate for a just government and then
designing a tax system to help achieve those goals).
reasons, the exchange model does not strongly support a broad education and
healthcare exclusion such as § 2503(e).
The empirical evidence is mixed with regard to which of these models
accurately depicts donor motivations, especially the motives of the wealthiest
donors subject to the federal wealth transfer taxes.186  Donors are likely
influenced by a mix of these and other purposes when they decide whether to
make a gratuitous transfer.187  Accordingly, economic models of donor
motivation are not a sufficient lodestar to guide one in the determination of
whether education and medical transfers should be included in the gift tax
base.  Moreover, the analysis of donor motivation was premised on a limited
interpretation of the backstop function of the gift taxthat only inter vivos
wealth transfers that are perfect substitutes for bequests should be included in
the gift tax base.188  A more nuanced interpretation of the role of the gift tax as
a backstop to the estate tax, and the one to which this article subscribes, is that
the gift tax must rest on normative foundations similar to those of the estate
tax.189  The next section suggests that equality of opportunity and family
autonomy are the relevant norms to consider in determining whether education
and healthcare transfers should be included in the gift tax base.  It frames these
competing considerations within a larger debate among liberal egalitarian
political theorists about whether the norm of equality of opportunity is
incommensurable with the institution of the family.
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190. See Fleischer, supra note 93, at 292; see also Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity,
supra note 189, at 1141-52 (arguing that equality of opportunity is the equity goal that a just
government should pursue and that the tax system, in general, should be designed to achieve
that goal).
191. 17 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 504-05 (meml ed. 1925), cited in Eisenstein,
supra note 20, at 229.  Other scholars consider the federal wealth transfer taxes to be supported
by the principle of equality of opportunity.  See, e.g., Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note 2;
James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001) [hereinafter
Repetti, Democracy, Taxes].
192. These respect-based arguments reflect the Kantian roots of the liberal egalitarian
tradition.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971).  Utilitarianism, however,
cannot account for a respect-orientated view.  See id. at 22-27.  It is therefore rejected as a
baseline principle for federal wealth transfer taxation.  See infra text accompanying note 193.
193. 17 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 191, at 504-05.
194. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1995) (addressing equality of
capabilities); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (discussing equality of resources).
195. See generally RAWLS, supra note 192, at 65-90.
V. Equality of Opportunity vs. Family Autonomy
A. Fair Equality of Opportunity
Equality of opportunity, though not defined in the IRC, is one of the core
principles supporting the taxation of wealth transfers.190  As early as 1907,
President Theodore Roosevelt advocated a tax on inheritances, arguing that
such a tax would help to preserve a measurable equality of opportunity for the
people of the generations growing to manhood.191  Yet the contours of this
foundational concept remain somewhat blurry.  
This article turns to political theoryin particular, liberal
egalitarianismto give content and meaning to the standard of equality of
opportunity.  Liberal egalitarians recognize the equal moral worth of all
individuals, a concept that implies that each individual should have an equal
opportunity to pursue his or her own vision of the good.192  This principle
closely aligns with President Roosevelts interpretation of the purpose of
federal wealth transfer taxes, namely, that there should be an equality of self-
respect and of mutual respect, an equality of rights before the law, and at least
an approximate equality in the conditions under which each man obtains the
chance to show the stuff that is in him when compared to his fellows.193
There are many different conceptions of equality of opportunity within the
liberal egalitarian tradition.194  This article applies only one version: John
Rawlss fair equality of opportunity.195  According to Rawls, social justice
is the manner in which public, or social, institutions facilitate fair
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196. See id. at 7 (stating that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society,
or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and
duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation).
197. See id. at 61-62.
198. Id. at 62.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 302.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 75-83.
203. See id. at 75.
204. See id. at 73.  Formal equality of opportunity can be traced back to Aristotle, who
participation in plural but limited primary goods.196  Primary goods
include the fundamental rights and liberties doled out by societal
institutions.197  These are the goods that every rational actor, no matter what
his or her vision of the good, would want.198  The essential primary goods are
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-
respect.199
In his now-famous argument in favor of a public, institutional concept of
justice, Rawls articulates two principles of justice to guide institutions in
distributing primary goods:
(1) [e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all, and 
(2) [s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . .
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.200
The first principle requiring equal liberty is lexically prior to the second
principle.201  Rawls calls the second principle the difference principle.202
Assuming fair equality of opportunity, it accepts inequalities in social and
economic primary goods provided that such inequality works to the maximum
advantage of the worst off in society.203  Accordingly, fair equality of
opportunity is a prerequisite for a distribution of wealth in society that satisfies
the demands of justice.  The ensuing discussion fleshes out the contours of this
baseline principal and its relationship to the federal wealth transfer taxes as a
whole, and § 2503(e) in particular.
Fair equality of opportunity includes not only formal equality of
opportunity (equal prospects for success given equal talents) but also
substantive equality of opportunity (equal life chances to develop equal
talents).204  Formal equality of opportunity prevents intentional discrimination
254 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:223
maintained that similar cases should be treated alike except where there is some relevant
difference.  JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW, JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 3 (2d
ed. 1991).  As Rawls indicates, however, treating similar cases similarly is not a sufficient
guarantee of substantive justice.  See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 72-73; see also FISHKIN, supra
note 12, at 4-5 (describing equal opportunity as requiring fair competition among individuals
for unequal positions in society, which entails adopting the assumptions of procedural fairness
(principle of merit) and substantive fairness (principle of equal life chances)).  
205. See NAGEL, supra note 12, at 102.
206. RAWLS, supra note 192, at 73. 
207. See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
208. See id.
209. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 73 (specifying that free market arrangements must be
set within a framework of political and legal institutions which . . . preserves the social
conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity).
210. See id.
211. NAGEL, supra note 12, at 102.  Nagel calls substantive equality of opportunity positive
equality of opportunity.  Id. at 102-03 (emphasis omitted).
212. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of
Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1730 (2005) (contending that equality of opportunity
based on race, sex, religion, or ethnicity.205  Substantive equality of
opportunity results when, assuming that there is a distribution of natural
assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same
willingness to use them, . . . have the same prospects of success regardless of
their initial place in the social system.206
These two conceptions of equality of opportunity mirror the two types of
liberty that modern political theories attempt to juggle, namely, negative and
positive liberty.  On one hand, equality of opportunity includes an emphasis
on negative libertythe right to be free from the sort of irrational
discrimination that undermines merit-based opportunities to participate and
succeed in a free market.207  On the other hand, equality of opportunity
requires a positive liberty right of equal access to public goods as a condition
of flourishing.208
Fair equality of opportunity directs social institutions to take affirmative
steps to protect free market arrangements from the various social factors that
threaten to undermine citizen participation.209  In other words, political and
legal institutions should counteract, among other things, the effect of
socioeconomic background on chances for success in life.210  Such institutions
should remedy hereditary advantage, a type of socioeconomic inequality
represented both in the possession of resources and in access to the means of
obtaining qualification for open competitive positions.211  Included among
these opportunity-ensuring institutions are those related to education and
healthcare.212
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requires  people [to] have access to resources such as healthcare, housing, and education).
213. RAWLS, supra note 192, at 73.
214. Id. at 275.
215. See id. at 73.  Specifically, Rawls argues that [c]hances to acquire cultural knowledge
and skills should not depend upon ones class position, and so the school system, whether public
or private, should be designed to even out class barriers.  Id.  Other liberal egalitarians share
this view.  See, e.g.,  Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note 2, at 477; Alstott, Family at Odds,
supra note 12, at 6-7; Harry Brighouse, Why Should States Fund Schools?, 46 BRIT. J. EDUC.
STUD. 138 (1998).  
216. Brighouse, supra note 215, at 138; see also Alstott, Family at Odds, supra note 12, at
26.  Alstott explains that 
[a] system of equal liberal education might, in principle, cultivate each child's
academic potential [regardless of class background] as well as her talents via
extracurricular activities. These schools would (again, in principle) help every
child explore different ways of life and would introduce children to adults
working in jobs and pursuits of interest to ensure that each child entered adult life
with a social network.
Id.
217. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 101 (stating that education helps to enabl[e] a person
to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for
each individual a secure sense of his own worth).  Rawls also explains that resources for
education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly according to their return as
estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according to their worth in enriching the
personal and social life of citizens, including here the less favored.  Id. at 107.
218. See Kornhauser, supra note 212, at 1735-36 & n.82 (citing studies that show that people
with lower education levels do not participate in the political process as much as those with
higher education levels).
219. See supra note 209.
Rawls is most explicit with regard to education, indicating that society must
ensure equal opportunities of education for all.213  Fair equality of
opportunity requires equal chances of education and culture for persons
similarly endowed and motivated, regardless of family background.214  Stated
differently, Rawls envisions the school system serving as a class equalizer.215
This view implies that to the greatest extent possible, the quality of education
received by each child should be independent of the level of wealth, education,
and wise choice-making ability of his or her parents.216  Rawls also considers
education instrumental in securing the primary goods of liberty and self-
respect.217  Individuals cannot meaningfully exercise their liberty rights and
participate in democracy if they lack the basic capabilities to make informed
decisions that education provides.218
Norman Daniels eloquently argues that healthcare, like education, is part of
the framework of social institutions designed to preserve[] the . . .
conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity.219  Specifically, he
contends that adequate healthcare maintain[s] normal species functioning, and
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220. Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
146, 147 (1981) [hereinafter Daniels, Health-Care Needs]; 
221. Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Healthcare, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2001, at
2, 3-4 [hereinafter Daniels, Justice, Health]. 
222. Daniels, Health-Care Needs, supra note 220, at 166.  Daniels also recognizes that
Rawlss emphasis on fairness in the competition for jobs and offices introduces an age bias into
the concept of equality of opportunity because the elderly are no longer part of that competition.
Daniels, Justice, Health, supra note 221, at 4-5.  To counteract this, he argues that an
individuals normal opportunity range should be age-relative.  Id. at 5; see also Daniels, Health-
Care Needs, supra note 220, at 170-71.  Specifically, he argues that fair allocation of health
resources between age groups should be based on the idea of prudent allocation over a life
span.  Daniels, Justice, Health, supra note 221, at 5.  He suggests that designers of a healthcare
system subjected to a situation similar to Rawlss veil of ignorance would conclude after
prudent deliberation that institutions should be designed to assure individuals a fair chance
at enjoyment of the normal opportunity range for each life-stage.  Norman Daniels, Justice
Between Age Groups: Am I My Parents Keeper?, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q., HEALTH
& SOCY 489, 510 (1983).
223. Daniels, Justice, Health, supra note 221, at 4 (defining appropriate healthcare to
include traditional public health[care] and preventive measuresthrough public or mixed
public and private insurance schemes).
224. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 278 (It is these institutions that are put in jeopardy
when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit; and political liberty likewise tends to lose
its value, and representative government to become such in appearance only.).
225. Id. at 277.
226. Id. at 277-78.  Here, Rawls is explicitly worried about outcomes, but only to the extent
that they undermine public institutions.  See id.
in turn, such normal functioning is an important determinant of the range of
opportunity open to an individual.220  When normal functioning is impaired
by disease or disability, the range of opportunities that would otherwise be
available is restricted.221  Daniels extends Rawlss fair equality of opportunity
concept by reasoning that if it is important to use resources to counter the
advantages . . . some get in the natural lottery, it is equally important to use
resources to counter the natural disadvantages induced by disease.222  Daniels
concludes that justice requires universal access to appropriate healthcare.223
Under Rawlss theory, the federal wealth transfer taxes serve as backstops
to opportunity-ensuring social institutions, protecting fair equality of
opportunity when excessive wealth inequalities impede these institutions
effectiveness.224  Rawls argues that government should levy estate and gift
taxes, not to raise revenue[,] . . . but gradually and continually to correct the
distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to
the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.225  Thus,
Rawls explicitly recognizes that excessive wealth inequalities can jeopardize
fair equality of opportunity and that the wealth transfer taxes perform the
crucial function of preventing dangerous accumulations of wealth.226
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227. See NORMAN DANIELS ET AL., BENCHMARKS OF FAIRNESS FOR HEALTHCARE REFORM
27-28 (1996) (analyzing the issue of whether fairness in healthcare is compatible with a tiered
healthcare system).  The authors conclude that tiering in healthcare is acceptable only if the
basic tier is not undermined economically or politically by the existence of higher tiers, and if
the inequality results in a system like the British system wherein most are served by the basic
tier and only the most fortunate in society purchase supplementary insurance, rather than a
system in which only the poor are served by the basic tier while the majority purchase
supplemental insurance.  See id.
228. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, supra note 191, at 849.
229. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 302.
230. See id.  Repetti also argues that inequality in opportunities will result in decreased
economic growth over the long term.  See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, supra note 191, at 838-
40.
231. See FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 71 (discussing the inadequacy of the public school
system as an institution ensuring positive equality of opportunity).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 213-18 (outlining Rawlss argument that education
is needed to offset the effects of family background) and 217-21 (outlining Danielss argument
that adequate healthcare is needed to ensure that ones normal opportunity range is not impaired
It is helpful here to explain exactly how excessive inequalities in wealth
pose a threat to fair equality of opportunity, including opportunities for
education and healthcare.  If the wealthy elite of a society opt out of the basic
system by purchasing more or better education or healthcare, then economic
and political support for the basic system may be undermined.227  James
Repetti argues that wealth concentration is harmful to democracy because it
enable[s] wealthy individuals to influence disproportionately the elective and
legislative process, as well as their communities.228  Co-option of the political
process by the wealthiest in society violates Rawlss first principle of justice,
equal liberty for all.229  Moreover, if those in control of the political process do
not have a direct personal interest in the success of basic education and
healthcare institutions, the political will to deal with issues of access, quality,
and funding may be lacking.  As a result, society will make inadequate
investments in the human capital of its poorest members, violating Rawlss
second principle of justice that allows inequalities of opportunity only if they
work to the advantage of the worst off in society.230  The state of the public
school systems in urban city centers provides a good example of the type of
harm that opt out can wreak.  As wealthy families have removed their children
from urban public schools by sending them to private schools (or by moving
to the suburbs), the basic public school system has steadily deteriorated.231
Rawlss account of fair equality of opportunity raises several important
objections to the exclusion of education and healthcare transfers from the gift
tax base under § 2503(e).  Education and healthcare cannot offset the effects
of family background and help maintain normal species functioning if access
to these institutions is itself stratified by socioeconomic class.232  Unequal
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by disease or disability).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 227-31.
234. Toon Vandevelde, Inheritance Taxation, Equal Opportunities and the Desire of
Immortality, in IS INHERITANCE LEGITIMATE?, supra note 152, at 1, 4.
235. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 302.
236. Daniels, Justice, Health, supra note 221, at 8.  The trickle-down theory holds that
societal welfare can be increased by focusing on economic policies that raise everyones
incomes, without regard for distributional concerns.  ICHIRO KAWACHI & BRUCE P. KENNEDY,
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: WHY INEQUALITY IS HARMFUL TO YOUR HEALTH 56 (2002).
237. Daniels, Justice, Health, supra note 221, at 8.  
238. The authors calculation of this figure is based on data from the U.S. Commerce
Departments Bureau of Economic Analysis.  See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dept of
Commerce, Current-Dollar and Real Gross Domestic Product (2009) (unpublished table) (real
GDP measured in chained 2000 dollars), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gd
plev.xls.
239. Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling Tide: Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the
U.S., 1989-2001, at 1 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 393, 2003), available
at http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp393.pdf.
240. Id. at 9 tbl.5.  
access to opportunity-ensuring institutions tends to solidify and potentially
magnify any existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income,
thereby frustrating the wealth-leveling goals of the federal wealth transfer
taxes.233  Furthermore, by exempting private education and healthcare
transfers, § 2503(e) encourages the wealthiest in society to opt out of the basic
system, thereby putting at risk that systems political and economic support.
Thus, from an equality of opportunity perspective, human capital transfers may
be more problematic than material wealth transfers.  As one commentator
remarked, [I]t is fairly reasonable to assume that education is more important
for success in life than an inheritance received at the age of 45.234
Proponents of § 2503(e) may counter by arguing that to the extent that
superior access to education and healthcare makes the wealthy more
productive, the economy will grow and everyone will be better off.  This
argument, however, misunderstands Rawlss second principle of justice.235  It
is not a philosophical version of trickle-down economics.236  Rather, the
difference principle requires a maximal flow downward so that over time
socioeconomic inequalities are flattened in a robust way.237
Furthermore, empirical data belie the claim that everyone benefits when the
economy grows.  From 1989 to 2001, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew in
real terms 41.67%.238  Household wealth at the end of 2001 was almost 50%
higher than the level in 1989.239  This wealth, however, remained highly
concentrated and unequally distributed.  As of 2001, households in the top 1%
of the wealth distribution held 32.7% of the total wealth in the economy, and
those in the top 5% held 57.7%.240  On the other end of spectrum, households
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241. Id.
242. See id. at 9 tbl.4.
243. See MICHAEL STRUDLER ET AL., STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., IRS,  FURTHER ANALYSIS
OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAXES, 1979-2002, at 2-3 (2004),   http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/04asastr.pdf. Strudler and his colleagues calculate that [t]he share of income
accounted for by the top 1 percent of the income distribution has climbed steadily from a low
of 9.58 percent . . . for 1979 to a high of 21.55 [percent] . . . for 2000.  Id. at 2.  Moreover,
[t]his pattern of an increasing share of total income is mirrored in the 1-to-5 percent class but
to a considerably lesser degree, increasing from 12.60 percent to 15.14 percent in this period.
Id. at 3.  During this same period, the shares of the lower percentile-size classes, from the [top]
10-to-20 percent classes to the four lowest quintiles, show declines in shares of total income.
Id.
244. See RAWLS, supra note 192, at 302-03; see also Brighouse, supra note 215, at 142
(describing the priority of equality of opportunity over the difference principle under Rawlss
theory).
245. RAWLS, supra note 192, at 87.
246. Id. at 300-01.
247. Id. at 302.
in the lowest fiftieth percentile of the wealth distribution held just 2.8% of the
total wealth in the economy.241  In 2001, the least advantaged families (more
than 10% of total families) had little or no assets.242  Income has also been
unequally distributed over the last quarter century, though it has not been as
concentrated as wealth.243
The utilitarian argument that everyone will be better off if education and
healthcare are concentrated in the wealthy also fails when applied to Rawlss
rights-based approach under which fair equality of opportunity precedes or has
priority over the difference principle.244  According to Rawls, outcomes will
satisfy the difference principle only assuming fair equality of opportunity
underwritten by education for all; and that the other equal liberties are
secured.245  Moreover, he states that consistency with the priority of fair
opportunity over the difference principle means that
it is not enough to argue . . . that the whole of society including the
least favored benefit from certain restrictions on equality of
opportunity.  We must also claim that the attempt to eliminate these
inequalities would so interfere with the social system and the
operations of the economy that in the long run anyway the
opportunities of the disadvantaged would be even more limited.
The priority of fair opportunity . . . means that we must appeal to
the chances given to those with the lesser opportunity.246
In other words, [t]he claim . . . must be that the opportunities of the least
favored sectors of the community would be still more limited if these
inequalities were removed.247
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248. Brighouse, supra note 215, at 142 (making this argument with regard to education
specifically).
249. This argument is more than hypothetical.  The repeal of the estate and generation-
skipping transfer taxes under EGTRRA was engineered by a few grassroots taxpayers with
strong feelings about the legitimacy of the federal wealth transfer tax system.  See generally
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
250. For purposes of this article, the term family is given the broadest possible meaning
and specifically includes a community composed of a child and one or more adults in a close
affective and physical relation.  FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 36 (citing JOHN E. COONS &
STEPHAN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 53 (1978));
accord Alstott, Family at Odds, supra note 12, at 15 (discussing one theory under which family
need not be defined by biological relationship between parent and child or by marriage (or a
sexual relationship) between parents).
251. RAWLS, supra note 192, at 74.  Rawlss solution to the effect of family on equality of
Accordingly, inequalities of opportunity in education and healthcare
fostered by § 2503(e) cannot be justified by the possibility that the share of
economic and social benefits for the least advantaged in society will be
increased.248  A stronger claim would be that any attempt to tax human capital
transfers undermines the legitimacy of the federal wealth transfer tax system
as a whole and may lead to its eventual demise.249  The inequalities of
opportunity that would result in a society without the protection of a federal
wealth transfer tax system are far worse than those that come from exempting
human capital transfers from taxation.  The next subsection of this article
outlines a theory of why attempting to tax human capital transfers under the
gift tax may put the legitimacy of the entire wealth transfer tax system at risk.
B. Family Automony
There is an inherent tension between the norm of equality of opportunity
and the institution of the family.250  Even if society could achieve fair equality
of opportunity (in the sense of equal access to opportunity-ensuring
institutions), equality of life chances would not necessarily result because an
individuals ability to utilize the provided resources might be limited (or
enhanced) by socioeconomic background.  Rawls explicitly recognizes this:
[T]he principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried
out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists.  The
extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes.  Even
the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in
the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social
circumstances.  It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances
of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed.251
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opportunity is the difference principle, which allows residual family inequalities to exist
provided that such inequalities improve the expectations of the least advantaged in society.  See
id. at 75-79; see also supra text accompanying notes 200-03.
252. See NAGEL, supra note 12, at 102.  Thomas Nagel recognizes that so long as children
grow up in families, they will inevitably benefit or suffer from the advantages or disadvantages
of their parents, even if inheritance of property at death is considerably restricted.  Id.  Nagel
suggests that such effects can be mitigated, at least in part, by public support for childcare,
education and the like.  Id.
253. See FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 8-9, 158-60.  Fishkin describes autonomy of the family
as both a positive liberty interest (allowing a family to govern the physical and psychological
health of the child and his or her knowledge of those social conventions necessary for
participation in adult society) and, drawing on Mills harm principle, a negative liberty interest
([s]o long as no one is severely harmed, intimate consensual relations[, including those of the
family,] should be immune from coercive interference).  Id. at 36, 42; see also Alstott, Family
at Odds, supra note 12, at 6 (identifying the family as a sphere of negative liberty). 
254. See FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 44; see also Michael B. Levy, Liberal Equality and
Inherited Wealth, 11 POL. THEORY 545, 555 (1983) (noting that under a Rawlsian framework,
both reward to merit and equality of full opportunity conflict with family lifethe former
because we are often rewarded for the accident of good birth, and the latter because such
accidents will inevitably exist as long as there are children with different parents).
255. FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 5, 44.
256. Id. at 50.
257. Id. at 64-65 (suggesting that [p]erhaps a massive system of collectivized child-rearing
could be devised to achieve such a result).  
Even if we completely abolished material inheritance, differences in family
background would still result in imperfect realization of the equality of
opportunity ideal.252
James Fishkin characterizes this conflict as a specific instance of a more
general conflict between liberty (autonomy of the family) and equality (formal
and substantive equality of opportunity).253  He describes a trilemma in
liberal theory in which society cannot simultaneously recognize parents
liberty interests in substantially influencing the development of their children
and achieve both substantive and formal equality of opportunity.254  He
suggests that only two of these goals can be satisfied at any given time.255
Under his scheme, substantive and formal equality of opportunity can only be
achieved by sacrificing family autonomy.256  Specifically, he argues that
[c]oercive interferences with the family would be required if advantaged
parents were to be prevented, systematically, from passing on cognitive,
affective, cultural, and social advantages to their children.257  He takes the
extreme position that [e]ither systematic intrusions into the family would be
required to equalize developmental conditions despite unequal outcomes or the
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258. Id. at 4.  Fishkin suggests that the trilemma only exists under conditions of substantial
social and economic inequalities.  Id. at 50.  Under his account, the conflict disappears once one
relaxes the assumption that such conditions exist.  Id.  He concludes that this means that liberal
theory is far more radical than it claims because it seeks to equalize results or outcomes rather
than only opportunities.  Id. at 50-51.
259. Id. at 43.
260. See NAGEL, supra note 12, at 3-4.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 4.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 102.
266. See id. at 109-10 (suggesting that [t]here is no possibility of abolishing this interest,
and no sane person would wish to do so).
267. See id. at 110; cf. FISHKIN, supra note 12, at 37 (advancing a definition of family
autonomy limited to choices regarding child development, thereby excluding the practice of
nepotism from the concept).
268. See NAGEL, supra note 12, at 110-11.
whole liberal focus on equality of opportunities, as distinct from equal
outcomes, would have to be abandoned.258
Fishkin also describes the conflict between family autonomy and equality
of opportunity as part of a larger conflict between conventional morality and
systematic liberal theory.259  Thomas Nagel characterizes this latter conflict
as a clash between partiality and impartiality, or between the personal and the
impersonal.260  Nagel theorizes that within every individual there are two
points of view that potentially conflict.261  The first is the collective-based,
impartial or impersonal viewpoint that tends toward equality.262  The second
is the personal perspective that gives rise to individualistic motives and
requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such
[collective] ideals.263  According to Nagel, If an arrangement is to claim the
support of those living under itif it is to claim legitimacy, in other
wordsthen it must rely on or call into existence some form of reasonable
integration of the elements of [individuals] naturally divided selves.264
Nagel applies his theory to the problem of inequality resulting from
hereditary advantage.265  The clash there is between the societal norm of
equality of opportunity and the special, personal interest that people take in
providing for those closest to them.266  He argues that prohibiting nepotism is
one step favoring the impartial over the personal.267  Societys insistence on
substantive equality of opportunity moves the line one more notch toward the
impersonal.268  Federal taxes on gratuitous transfers of material wealth
presumably inch the line yet another step toward the impersonal side of the
spectrum.  There remains, however, a very large category of residual
inequalities owing to family circumstances, the approach to which defines the
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269. Id. at 111.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 111-12.
272. Hearing, supra note 108, at 176.
273. Id. at 150, 151 (statement of Malcolm A. Moore, Probate and Trust Division Director,
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association).
274. See Am. Law Inst., supra note 50, at 20.
275. Id.
modern liberal mentality.269  Nagel describes the modern liberals
motivational split as follows:
[E]ven if such persons support the public provision of education
and health care for all, . . . they will not stop favoring their children
in their more personal choices.  If they have the resources, they will
continue to offer whatever extra advantages they can, by paying for
superior education, by direct cultural enrichment, and by various
forms of financial support.  While these things are good in
themselves, they also aim to give the child a competitive edge.270
The question is, how much farther can societal institutions, including the
federal wealth transfer taxes, push the line toward impartial equality without
generating pushback from the personal side that will inevitably invade the
political sphere?271  Prior to ERTA, there was strong taxpayer opposition to
correcting inequities resulting from differences in family background by
regulating through taxation parents ability to provide private education for
their children or healthcare for their elderly relatives.  Taxpayer sentiment on
this issue was presented to Congress during the hearings leading up to
enactment of § 2503(e).  The then-chairman and chairman-elect of the
American Bar Associations Section of Taxation argued, [M]ost taxpayers do
not regard [expenditures for education and support for aged relatives] as gifts
and do not report them for gift tax purposes.  Furthermore, it is doubtful that
taxpayers can ever be convinced to treat such transfers as gifts.272  Another
witness testified that [m]ost people arent aware that . . . payment of
[education] expenses for a child to whom no support obligation is owed
constitutes a gift.  That notion is very offensive to me and to all of my
clients. . . . I can almost guarantee you they are not going to file a gift tax
return.273  Even as far back as 1969, the ALI identified as problematic the fact
that most families did not consider human capital transfers to be gifts.274  In
proposing its solution, the ALI indicated that it was responding to normal
family reactions in regard to intra-family movement of property.275
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276. Ray, supra note 47, at 427; see also id. at 444-45 (delineating then-existing sanctions
for knowing and unknowing violations of the federal gift tax filing and payment requirements).
277. See id. at 427 (speculating that the lack of IRS enforcement was due to low potential
current revenue yield, likely unpopularity of such efforts, and adverse congressional reaction);
see also Gutman, supra note 34, at 1242.  This set of circumstances placed estate planning
advisors in the uncomfortable position of having to inform their clients that these transfers were
technically gifts, knowing that unadvised individuals would simply fail to report them with
virtually complete immunity.  See Popovich, supra note 64, at 371-72.
278. See Hearing, supra note 108, at 319 (statement of Robert M. Bellatti, Chairman, Illinois
State Bar Association that [i]mposing tax consequences on these common parental
expenditures [for education and healthcare] erodes the citizens respect for the entire transfer
tax system).
279. See Kornhauser, supra note 212, at 1737 (positing that [p]eople willingly pay tax only
if they think the tax is legitimate both in terms of originating from a fair process and in terms
of resulting in a just outcome (spreading the tax burden in a fair manner)).
280. See generally Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making
It Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759 (2007).  Compliance with the reporting and payment
requirements of the estate tax is heightened, as compared to the gift tax, because the estate tax
is embedded within the larger legal process of administering the decedents estate.  This larger
legal process is subject to state-law requirements, is overseen by a fiduciary, and includes
multiple interested parties who all have competing claims on the decedents assets.  These
factors tend to ensure the integrity of the administration process and of the estate tax filing and
payment requirements as a by-product.  By contrast, inter vivos intrafamily gifts occur in
private, outside of any organized legal process.
281. See discussion supra Part V.B.
Pre-ERTA opposition to the gift taxation of education and healthcare
transfers led to large-scale violations of gift tax filing requirements.276
Compounding this problem was a lack of enforcement by the IRS.277  This
situation undermined taxpayer respect for the federal wealth transfer tax
system as a whole.278  Our tax system relies on self-reporting, and its success
depends in part on taxpayers view of it as legitimate.279 The federal gift tax
is notoriously difficult to enforce, making legitimacy particularly important as
a promoter of voluntary compliance.280  Thus, lack of congressional
recognition of the personal motivations behind human capital transfers
impaired the ability of the federal wealth transfer tax system to achieve its
wealth-leveling goals.
VI. Alternative Proposal
That § 2503(e) can be justified as an accommodation to family autonomy
within the federal wealth transfer tax system does not end the analysis, for
family autonomy can run counter to the opportunity-equalizing goals of the
federal wealth transfer taxes.281  Lawmakers must actively wrestle with the
issue of where to draw the line between impartial equality and partial family
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285. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(b), 95 Stat. 172,
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interests.  As Murphy and Nagel recognize, this is not an easy task given that
the motives of justice and self-interest may not point in the same direction . . .
and [that] the process of finding an accommodation between them poses some
of the hardest problems of ethics, political theory, and practical politics.282
At first blush, it appears that these competing values are incommensurable:
either the state protects equality of opportunity at the expense of family
autonomy or it protects the latter at the expense of the former.  While some
scholarship suggests that these two liberal values can be integrated,283
Congresss all-or-nothing approach to the gift taxation of these transfers
suggests that it has implicitly adopted the incommensurability view.  Prior to
1981, Congress elevated positive equality of opportunity over family
autonomy by taxing all education and healthcare transfers.284  Reversing
course, under ERTA Congress excluded all tuition and medical expense
payments from gift taxation, promoting family autonomy but failing to respect
the demands of equality of opportunity.285
Given that these foundational principles conflict, an all-or-nothing
legislative approach is inappropriate.  Rather, Congress should attempt to
balance these competing interests by adopting a middle-ground approach to
the taxation of human capital transfers.  This section proposes an alternative
to the unlimited gift tax exclusion for tuition and medical care payments.
Specifically, Congress should convert § 2503(e) into a gift tax credit available
after application of the unified credit.  This approach effectively includes
education and healthcare transfers in the gift tax base (furthering equality of
opportunity) but prevents such inclusion from ever causing a gift tax to be due
and payable (recognizing family autonomy concerns). 
Recall that the current exclusion removes education and healthcare transfers
entirely from the gift tax base and is available in addition to the annual and
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human capital) made in the year when the unified credit was exhausted.  One option would be
to apply the credits sequentially (unified credit followed by education/medical expense credit)
to the different types of transfers in the order in which they were made.  This approach would
make the timing of the various transfers crucially important and might be subject to
manipulation by taxpayers.  Alternatively, the unified credit could be automatically applied to
material transfers, and any remaining unified credit plus the education/medical expense credit
applied to any human capital transfers.  This option would be the most taxpayer friendly.  A
final option would be to apply the credits based on the proportion of each type of transfer made
during the year of exhaustion of the unified credit.  
289. One legitimate administrative concern with this proposal is the increased gift tax return
filing that would be necessitated by inclusion of education and medical care payments in the tax
base.  To the extent that such transfers exceeded the annual exclusion in any given year, a gift
tax return would be necessary to shelter such transfers under either the donors unified credit
or the proposed education/medical expense credit.  See I.R.C. § 6019 (2006); see also supra
note 54 and accompanying text.  The burden on taxpayers could be substantially reduced if
available electronic filing software produced gift tax returns in addition to income tax returns.
Alternatively, gift tax reporting could be accommodated on the individual income tax return
(Form 1040), negating the need to file a separate gift tax return.  Cf. Dodge, Replacing the
Estate Tax, supra note 62, at 1023 (suggesting that any tax owed by transferees under a
cumulative lifetime accessions tax be reported on a separate line of the individual income tax
return, and suggesting that the IRS keep track of cumulative lifetime accessions on behalf of
all taxpayers).  In either case, the real increased burden would fall on the IRS.
290. One potential problem with the proposal is the ability of an ultrawealthy donor to
strategically avoid it by initially transferring up to the lifetime exemption amount to a trust and
thereafter making education and healthcare payments as needed.  This would put the donor in
the same tax position as he or she would be in under current law.  The proposal would then tend
to impact only the merely wealthy because they would be unable to part with such a large sum
lifetime exemption amounts.286  Outright repeal of § 2503(e) would cause
human capital transfers to be subject to gift taxation in the same manner as
material gifts, meaning that such transfers could pass tax-free only if sheltered
by the annual exclusion or unified credit (lifetime exemption equivalent).287
The effect of converting § 2503(e) into a tax credit available after application
of the unified credit would be the same as outright repeal up until exhaustion
of the lifetime exemption amount.288  Thereafter, however, a donors additional
material transfers would cause a gift tax to be payable, but additional
education and healthcare transfers would remain gift tax-free because of the
proposed tax credit.289
The practical effect of the proposal, then, is to force a donor to use his or
her general gift tax exemptions to shelter education and medical care transfers,
thereby reducing the amount of tax-free material transfers that he or she can
make.290  This approach recognizes that human capital transfers pose as much,
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296. See Smith, supra note 27, at 401 (suggesting that one of the functions of the annual
exclusion is to protect normal family and friend-type gifts from taxation and reporting).
297. See I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505 (2006) (providing that in 2009 the applicable exclusion
amount for gift tax purposes was $1,000,000); see also Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B.
1107, 1113-14 (providing that in 2009 the inflation-adjusted annual exclusion amount was
$13,000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb08-45.pdf.
if not more, of a threat to fair equality of opportunity as do material
transfers.291  Accordingly, the proposal generally treats both types of transfers
similarly for gift tax purposes.  In doing so, it implicitly adopts the
Kotlikoff/Becker and Tomes view that from the donors perspective, human-
capital and material transfers are substitutes.292  Treating them as such
enhances overall progressivity in the gift tax system by generally taxing all
donors at increasingly higher marginal rates as their total (human and
nonhuman) transfers increase.293  Increasing the progressivity in the federal
wealth transfer system assists in reducing concentrations of wealth that
threaten equality of opportunity.294  The proposal generally rejects the
Arrondel and Masson view that human capital transfers are qualitatively
different from material transfers and the implication that this difference should
matter from a gift tax perspective.295
Forcing a donor to use his or her general gift tax exemptions to shelter
human capital transfers seems appropriate in light of the role of these
exemptions in the federal wealth transfer tax scheme.  In designing the gift and
estate taxes, Congress implicitly recognized the need to allow reasonable space
for tax-free expression of personal motives.  In particular, the annual gift tax
exclusion and the unified credit against gift tax serve family-autonomy-
furthering functions,296 especially at their current elevated levels,297 which
allow a living donor to more than adequately maintain his or her family.
Furthermore, the increased unified credit available for estate tax purposes
under EGTRRA allows a donor to leave an additional (more than reasonable)
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303. See Alstott, Family Values, supra note 12, at pt. V, para. 1.
tax-free material inheritance to those closest to him or her.298  As a result, in
the present transfer tax environment, the pressure on family autonomy is
substantially less than in the pre-ERTA, pre-EGTRRA era.  This implies that
there is little or no need for an additional release valve in the form of a
categorically targeted, unlimited education and healthcare exclusion such as
§ 2503(e).299
Although the proposal nominally balances the competing norms of equality
of opportunity and family autonomy, if the proposal is routinely ignored
because of taxpayers beliefs about its propriety, no actual balancing will
occur.  Taxpayer resistance to the gift taxation of education and healthcare
transfers is driven, at least in part, by the reality that society views families not
only as social but also as economic units.  As described in Part I above, state
law requires parents to financially support their minor children.300  Even in
situations where no legal obligation of support exists, society imposes an
effective obligation of support.  Many of our educational and healthcare
institutions require or encourage families to provide for their own members if
they can, and the institutions only intervene when family support is inadequate
or unavailable.  For example, eligibility for the Federal Pell Grant Program,
the largest federal college grant program, is means tested.  The formula used
to determine financial need includes not only the income and assets of the
student, but also those of his or her parent(s).301  In other words, the federal
formula requires parents with means to contribute to a childs college
expenditures before federal grant aid will become available.302
There is seemingly a contradiction between societys functional view of
the family as one of the social institutions that help[s] secure economic
security for its members303 and societys decision to tax the provision of such
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security.  In advocating a wealth transfer tax, Franklin D. Roosevelt was well
aware of this inherent tension:
The desire to provide security for ones self and ones family is
natural and wholesome, but it is adequately served by a reasonable
inheritance.  Great accumulations of wealth cannot be justified on
the basis of personal and family security.  In the last analysis such
accumulations amount to the perpetuation of great and undesirable
concentration of control in a relatively few individuals over the
employment and welfare of many, many others.304
This contradiction disappears, however, when one recognizes that the generous
gift tax exemptions in the form of the annual exclusion and the unified credit
allow for satisfaction of these familial support obligations in a gift-tax efficient
manner.  As Anne Alstott argues, high exemption levels fail to resolve the
functional-family objection to inheritance taxation only if the ideal of the
functional family insists that 100% of family wealth should be available to
meet family members . . . needs.305
Furthermore, transfers that discharge a legally imposed support obligation
will remain gift tax-free under the proposal.306  This in and of itself is a
significant concession favoring family autonomy over equality of opportunity.
Human capital transfers that benefit minor children are probably more
problematic from an equality of opportunity standpoint than those same
transfers to adult beneficiaries.  Superior access to medical and educational
institutions during the early years of development tends to favorably affect an
individuals lifetime opportunity set more than education or healthcare
received much later in life.307  Generally, the opportunity to use the provided
resources to affect life chances declines over a persons lifetime.308
Despite the general propriety of including human capital transfers in the gift
tax base and forcing a donor to use his or her general gift tax exemptions to
shelter such transfers, there are two prototypical situations that still require
redress.  The first is the situation where an adult child with no remaining
unified credit pays the medical expenses of an elderly relative in a year in
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which such expenses exceed the annual exclusion.  The second is where a
grandparent pays a grandchilds primary- and secondary-school expenses
under the same conditions.309 In both cases, the transfers would actually result
in a gift tax payable instead of passing gift tax-free under the annual or lifetime
exclusion amounts.  These scenarios are especially likely to occur given the
reduced applicable exclusion amount available to shelter inter vivos transfers
(as opposed to transfers at death) under EGTRRA.310
Requiring these two prototypical transferors to pay a gift tax would likely
cause pushback from taxpayers that could undermine support for general
inclusion of human capital transfers in the gift tax base.  A small concession
to family autonomy is justified on these grounds.  Accordingly, the proposal
outlined above would provide limited, targeted relief from gift tax liability
resulting from the general inclusion of education and healthcare transfers in
the gift tax base.  This relief would take the form of a tax credit available after
application of the gift tax unified credit.  While this limited exception is
largely symbolic, symbolism matters in shaping perceptions, and perceptions
matter in shaping beliefs.  If taxpayers perceive that Congress is attempting to
balance family autonomy against equality of opportunity, their view of the
legitimacy of the product of such balancing efforts will be enhanced.
VII. Conclusion
This article addressed the question of whether education and healthcare
transfers should be included in the gift tax base.  It initially framed the issue
in two ways: (1) through the lens of a proposal by the American Law Institute
to exempt all transfers for consumption from gift taxation, and (2) within the
context of a debate among economists about whether such expenditures should
be included in the definition of intergenerational transfers for purposes of
determining the total share of such transfers in U.S. accumulated wealth.
Finding the first lens unsatisfactory on its own doctrinal terms and the second
lens inconclusive, the article shifted the focus of analysis to the normative first
principles implicated by this inquiry, namely, equality of opportunity and
family autonomy. 
The main claim of this article is that the exclusion of education and
healthcare transfers from the gift tax base is indefensible under an equal
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opportunity framework, but that outright repeal of the exclusion is neither
desirable (because of the competing value of family autonomy) nor politically
possible.  Accordingly, this article proposes an alternative to the current
unlimited gift tax exclusion for tuition and medical care payments that
appropriately balances these competing norms in a politically feasible manner:
Congress should convert the existing gift tax exclusion into a tax credit
available after application of the gift tax unified credit. 
